Monday, December 15, 2003

Yahoo! Search Results for arab gay hard core

How the hell did someone get to my site by searching for "arab gay hard core"?

I suppose it was writing separately about same sex marriage a bit and the Middle East a lot.

Um, sorry to disappoint.
Wampum: 2003 Koufax Award Most Humorous Post Nominees

So, I've been nominated for Most Humorous Post over at wampum. The astonishing thing is that I didn't nominate myself for this post. That means someone else did.

My head is spinning.

Anyway, I just read over the other posts, and I have to say most of them are funnier than mine. I think my vote is going to go to this one. Very funny.

So many blogs, so little time.
Perhaps the classic military problem is desertion. Go back and read the Greeks (Homer is a great example) - even in a thoroughly militarized culture, and in front of all their friends, people still kept chucking their (very heavy) armor away and fleeing when the going got tough.

Now Boing Boing reports that the problem has come up again in a thoroughly modern form.

Hilarious.
If you've just wandered in from Wampum or anywhere else, welcome! I'm a graduate student emeritus in philosophy with a serious addiction to blogging. As long as you're here, why not take a tour of my greatest hits?

In this post, I imagine Bush channeling William Carlos williams. And I've rather immodestly nominated myself for best post for this piece on Iraqi debt relief.

I've spent many an hour spanking naughty right-wingers, including Christopher Hitchens (and earlier, here),Bernard Lewis (from August), and Charles Krauthammer. But I'm also a scrupulously fair and balanced blogger. Here, I criticize the anti-war movement's powers of prediction. And I've even written to Paul Krugman to gently chide him for being excessively optimistic about Republicans.

(UPDATE: Shame on me. For all his faults, Hitchens is not a right winger. Conflating right/left categories with pro/anti war categories is exactly the sort of thing I would complain about if I saw someone else doing it. Mea culpa.)

Can't get enough? Here, your eagle eyed blogger notices that Wolfowitz pretty much disowned the aluminum tubes story 5 days before it found its way into the State of the Union Speach. Whoops! (As far as I know, no one ever pointed this out.)

Here, I sagely draw attention to incoherent attitudes towards risk among contemporary hawks.

I respond to the President's speech promoting democracy in the Middle East here, with a few more thoughts here.

Here, I urge everyone - if only they would listen! - to beware simplistic claims about Iraqi self-determination.

My 15 minute solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, was posted before (at the end of August) the recent rumblings within the Israeli right about the coming demographic threat to Israel.

And finally, here is a post from April on why the issue of Kurdish independence isn't likely to go away.

Enjoy, and visit often!

Sunday, December 14, 2003

If not for the internet, I would probably never have come across this Latin rap. And my life would have been just a bit less rich and rewarding than it is now.

Link via cannylinguist.
As predicted . . . Here's the Human Rights Watch press release:
Iraq: No Political Show Trial for Saddam Hussein
International Expert Participation Key to Trial

(New York, December 14, 2003) - The Iraqi Governing Council must not mount
a political show trial of Saddam Hussein, Human Rights Watch warned today.

The U.S. Fourth Infantry Division took Saddam Hussein into custody
yesterday. U.S. forces have not announced what they plan to do with the
former Iraqi leader, but have previously made clear their support for an
Iraqi tribunal to carry out prosecutions for crimes of the past. Last week,
the Iraqi Governing Council created a new tribunal to prosecute the crimes
of Iraq's past.

"Saddam Hussein's capture is a welcome development and it's important that
the Iraqi people feel ownership of his trial," said Kenneth Roth, executive
director of Human Rights Watch. "But it's equally important that the trial
not be perceived as vengeful justice. For that reason, international
jurists must be involved in the process."

Human Rights Watch has compiled substantial dossiers on the crimes of the
former Iraqi leader, and published numerous reports on human rights abuse
under his rule, including genocide and crimes against humanity.

On December 10, the Iraqi Governing Council issued a law establishing a
tribunal to try genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The
tribunal law includes provisions on the rights of the accused and applies
definitions of international crimes that are largely consistent with
international law. However, key provisions are lacking to ensure
legitimate and credible trials.

The tribunal law does not require that judges and prosecutors have
experience working on complex criminal cases and cases involving serious
human rights crimes. Nor does the law permit the appointment of non-Iraqi
prosecutors or investigative judges with relevant expertise.

"Iraq has no experience with trials lasting more than a few days," said
Roth. "International expertise in prosecuting genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity cases must be utilized to ensure a fair and
effective trial."

Human Rights Watch said any court conducting the trial must be independent
of political influence, and free of bias and partiality. The trial must
give the benefit of every protection for the rights of the accused under
international law. Saddam Hussein must be allowed to conduct a vigorous
defense that includes the right to legal counsel at an early stage.

The tribunal law does not prohibit the death penalty and does not ensure
that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the law
does not sufficiently address protection of witnesses and victims or
security for the tribunal and its staff.

"Any tribunal trying Saddam Hussein should apply international standards of
justice," said Roth. "To do otherwise would blur the distinction between
the Ba'ath Party period and the Iraq of the future."

Human Rights Watch has recommended forming a Group of Experts including
Iraqi and international specialists to suggest appropriate accountability
mechanisms and facilitate collection and preservation of evidence. A mixed
Group of Experts would allow Iraqi jurists to draw on international
experience gained from trying serious past crimes committed in the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, Human Rights Watch said.

"The Iraqi Governing Council should partner with the United Nations to
create an accountability process that works," said Roth. "There won't be a
second chance to do this right."

Some of the crimes for which Saddam Hussein might be prosecuted include:

- The genocidal Anfal campaign against the Iraqi Kurds, which resulted in
the deaths of some 100,000 civilians and the destruction of more than
4,000 villages;
- The use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Kurdish
civilians;
- The large-scale killings that followed the failed 1991 uprisings in the
north and south of Iraq;
- The destruction and repression of the Marsh Arabs; and
- The forced expulsion of ethnic minorities in Northern Iraq during the
"Arabization" campaign.

For more information on justice and Iraq, please see
http://staging.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/#Justice

To read the Human Rights Watch policy paper, "Ensuring Justice for Iraq:
Evidence Preservation and Fair Trials," please see:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/09/iraq091203.htm
Blast Misses Pakistani President’s Car

Great. This is just the sort of thing we want to hear about from a nuclear state.
CBC News: Saddam should be tried by internationally recognized court: Martin

It's started. The new Prime Minister of Canada wants S.H. tried in some international setting or other.

Oh boy. If I were the new Prime Minister I confess I might be looking to pick a fight with Bush. But I think I'd try and pick it really carefully. The Arar mess would be worth starting a row about, for example. It looks here as though Martin just shot his mouth off.

I'm guessing this doesn't go down well in Washington.

I'm expecting an urgent Human Rights Watch bulletin any moment now stressing the need for a fair and impartial trial, and all that. I imagine that whoever writes those things was shaken out of bed this morning and sent into the office (which, if it is the main headquarters in NYC, will be a pain, since it's really snowing here). I'll post it when I get it.

I'm really conflicted about this. A trial would be part of an attempt to heal a culture deformed by brutality and injustice. But to be effective it can't completely write off the sensibilities of the target culture. And the fact is, as far as I can tell, that most Iraqis would be absolutely scandalized by any penalty short of death. I'm an opponent of the death penalty, at least in the contexts it is typically evaluated. But these aren't typical contexts. And it's just a bit too pat for HRW and everyone else to pile on with lofty little speeches taking a principled and dispassionate position against the death penalty. Perhaps that's the right view, but I suppose I'd be gratified to see just a bit more ambivalence there.

And anyway, does it really serve the interests of justice to see Saddam Hussein making long televised speeches in some court a la Milosovic? Will this really be, on balance, the best way to bring peace to all his victims, or to his broken country?

Yeah, I know, I know, I should think more about uniformity, procedure, principle, etc. And I will, I promise.

But, as I said, I'm conflicted. You should be too.
Along with Chris at Crooked Timber, I have to disagree with this post by Atrios:
These are just some unorganized idle thoughts before I've had a cup of coffee. Capturing Saddam is a good thing - he was a bad guy. I'm really glad he was captured and not killed.

But, it really doesn't change much. Capturing Saddam isn't going to end the resistance to the US occupation in Iraq. It may improve things slightly, or it could even make it worse, but the net effect will probably be negligible. Saddam was a bad guy, but it isn't clear he's any worse of a guy than some of the folks who are a part of our "Coalition of the Willing," so this pretense of moral clarity, etc... is ridiculous.

Saddam wasn't a threat to us. This was a war of choice and we made a bad choice (and many more bad choices subsequently). Kosovo was also a war of choice. Whether or not that was a bad choice, consider the disparity in the media coverage of those wars.

And, cynical me just has to ask - who's the enemy now? The base needs one.

Did they really call it "operation Red Dawn?" oy
I think he needs that cup of coffee. It wasn't just the U.S. who called Saddam evil. It was every credible human rights organization in the world. And I'm all for focussing on the very serious human rights abuses committed by U.S. allies, but I'm also for drawing distinctions. And Saddam Hussein really was almost unique among living dictators in the evil he managed to pull off. I'd like to know which members of the Coalition of the Willing Atrios has in mind. I've been complaining about Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for a while now, for example, but I still don't think the amount of suffering and harm caused by these U.S. allies is comparable to what Saddam Hussein was able to do even in the last decade while the U.S. kept him under wraps. Again, I'm all for bashing hypocrisy and ugly alliances, but this is just an insulting distortion of the facts.

Atrios is also wrong that the net effect will be negligible. I think capturing him alive is huge. It will probably have some effect on the resistance, but the main effect is probably going to be that George Bush's life just got rhetorically easier in the short run, and much messier in the long run. There's going to be a huge fight about what to do with him, and unlike Atrios, I rather wish he'd just been shot. This is a lazy sentiment, I know, since it can be healthy to bring justice and go through a process blah blah blah.

Go over to Human Rights Watch and read about what the man has done. Or read this book by Charles Tripp (which I used for a class last year on the Iraq war). I hope the expression "bad guy" was supposed to be ironic understatement.

Ugh.

BBC NEWS | World | Middle East | Saddam Hussein arrested in Iraq

Ha! Now things will get very interesting. I was a bit surprised that he gave up without a fight, but I suppose I shouldn't have been.

We can hope that a quiet arrest will further diminish his reputation, even among die-hards. And yet, a quiet arrest may prove to be almost as much of a pain in the ass for the U.S. as the absense of WMD.

Now the angry debates start: How to try him? Where? With what possible range of penalties? Using what evidence (will it, perhaps, stretch back to the 80s)? Will he be able to make speeches, a la Milosovic (hint: no)? And if not, who will howl first for a fair trial? What the hell would a fair trial even look like here? Will the British be consulted about any of this? Will their opposition to the death penalty matter here?

Ooooo, feeling dizzy. Early on I thought he would be caught much quicker than this. But I didn't think he would ever be caught like this.

He's not just evil. He's also so very . . . . inconvenient. The latter will weigh, I think, most heavily on the admin in the coming months.

Saturday, December 13, 2003

The Pentagon Plot - Baker's trip isn't about debt, and the contracts directive isn't about money. By Fred Kaplan

You can quibble with the details, but as far as I can tell this piece pretty much gets it right.
Also via Radosh is the news that the Policy Analysis Market is back in business, with a few modifications. I mostly agree with Radosh on this one.
Heaneyland!: Together, we can change the dictionary

Wow. They're right. Igry is a word we all need.

Link via Radosh.

Friday, December 12, 2003

Oh, that Silvio, he's a classy guy!
Good golly, I'd rather blog than grade papers.

Fancy that!
Sometimes Hitchens drives me nuts. Really, really nuts. But then he goes and gives this savagely funny and intelligent interview. (Link via Normblog) Two highlights:
Still, the solution of a local land-dispute between competing petty tribes ought not to be beyond the wit of man. The argument is contained within a quadrilateral. Either one side can defeat and expel or exterminate the other. Or there can be a sharing of the territory. Or the conflict may exhaust and destroy both parties. Or the status quo - a kind of armed and unstable apartheid truce - can be assumed to continue indefinitely.

And how about this:
In my opinion, Israel doesn't "give up" anything by abandoning religious expansionism in the West Bank and Gaza. It does itself a favor, because it confronts the internal clerical and chauvinist forces which want to instate a theocracy for Jews, and because it abandons a scheme which is doomed to fail in the worst possible way. The so-called "security" question operates in reverse, because as I may have said already, only a moral and political idiot would place Jews in a settlement in Gaza in the wild belief that this would make them more safe.
Yes, yes, and yes, Mr. Hitchens. When you're not being a simplistic dolt you're really bang on.

In a way this makes me even more annoyed with him for being a simplistic dolt: It's obvious he can avoid it when he chooses.
Mark Kleiman has an interesting idea for dealing with illegal immigration:
Here's my proposal for an employer-sanctions program that would work: Any person who gives testimony leading to the conviction of an employer for hiring an undocumented worker, including the worker himself, gets a green card. As long as the identity system is strong enough so that employers can obey the law if they want to, the result would be an immediate drying-up of the demand for undocumented labor.
Ah, but there's a problem with this: It would probably work. In fact, it would probably work so well that the courts would be full for a good long time. Also - and I admit my grasp of economics is not so hot - wouldn't the American economy tank if it (all of a sudden) couldn't rely on a pool of illegal (and therefore delightfully coercible) labour? And though it isn't a reason not to try, I think the strategy is risky since it targets the wrong social class. Many of the targets would be able to afford lawyers, and that is much more expensive than charging poor people. And not to sound paranoid, but you could expect the inevitable backlash: Inordinate attention paid to the few cases of people gaming the system for green cards, etc., all designed to generate strong resistance to the policy.

But I think that Kleiman is right. This is one perfectly obvious and implementable solution to the problem of illegal labour. I just don't think enough people want it solved.
CBC News: Inuit threaten to charge U.S., Russia with human rights abuse

This is interesting.

There are at least two distinct issues here: Will the U.S. and other countries be vulnerable to lawsuits in the future for their failure to act on global climate change? Are today's polluters and emitters the equivalent of yesterday's tobacco companies, sitting on essential evidence, lying, evading and failing to act? And, second, is this issue best framed in human rights talk? My guess is that the answer to the first question is some sort of yes. As to the second, I prefer to reserve the term "human rights" for all but the most basic of rights. We need some phrase that marks out the least (theoretically) controversial rights a human being can have simply in virtue of her humanity, and the term "human rights" seems well suited for that.

But besides that, more power to 'em!
The State Department responds. At least it looks like a response to the recent criticism from Human Rights Watch on the problem of cluster munitions in Iraq:
Media Note
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
December 12, 2003

Progress in Clearing Iraq's Landmine Legacy

In May 2003, the U.S. Department of State established the first national mine action program in Iraq's history. Eight months later, professionally trained Iraqi managers and deminers are ready to tackle millions of persistent landmines and other explosive remnants of war that litter Iraq.

Since May, the Department, working with the Coalition Provisional Authority and with assistance from the Department of Defense's Humanitarian Demining Training Center, has:

* Established Iraq's National Mine Action Authority and Mine Action Center to
manage strategic planning and budgeting, project coordination, donor
relations, mine risk education, setting national mine action standards, and
maintaining the national mine action database. Iraq's ethnic and religious
communities are reflected in the composition of the staff;
* Engaged 60 Iraqi civil servants, men and women, to fill key positions at
the National Mine Action Authority and National and Regional Mine Action
Centers;
* Arranged for key National Mine Action Authority staff to receive senior and
mid-level management training from the Geneva International Center for
Humanitarian Demining and Mine Action Unit of the Royal Military College of
Sciences at Cranfield University;
* Created the 110-person non-governmental "Iraqi Mine/UXO Clearance
Organization" equipped with modern metal detectors, mine detecting dogs,
manual demining and explosive ordnance demolition expertise, highly
qualified medical technicians, and logistic and administrative support
personnel and equipment; and
* Transitioned a significant mine action program developed and operated
independently by the UN Office for Project Services in the three
predominantly Kurdish provinces of northern Iraq to the control of the
National Mine Action Authority in Baghdad.

Until last spring, humanitarian mine action efforts were limited to the former northern "no fly" zone. Civilians living under the Saddam Hussein regime risked injury or death from persistent landmines laid by his forces. Saddam Hussein actually prohibited humanitarian demining on territory that he controlled.

Some persistent landmines found in Iraq were laid in World War II. But most were placed by Iraqi forces during Saddam Hussein's internal and external conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. Iraq laid more mines on its own soil during the 1991 Gulf War following its invasion of Kuwait, and sowed additional mines on its territory during the 2003 conflict.

Following the liberation, Coalition forces, the Department of State's Quick Reaction Demining Force, Department of State-contracted RONCO Consulting Corporation, and some non-governmental organizations rapidly began clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout Iraq, returning valuable agricultural land and infrastructure to productive use. Quick Reaction Demining Force clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance around downed power lines enabled Iraqi crews to repair the electrical grid system and increase power to Baghdad by fifty percent, affecting the service of over 3 million Iraqis.

To learn more about the U.S. Department of State's humanitarian mine action programs in Iraq and 35 other countries and its related small arms and light weapons abatement efforts, visit www.state.gov/t/pm/wra.
Cutting James Baker’s Ties

Finally a decent editorial in the New York Times.
Krugman gets it right today, with a piece slamming Wolfie and the neo-cons. He sees the timing of the bar on contracts in the same way I do - as a ploy to sabotage Baker's efforts to renegotiate debt (at least, that's what I strongly suspect - I could be wrong).

A few thoughts: I'm not particularly happy with the last line of the piece: "What we've just learned is how hard and dirty the doctrine's proponents will fight against the inevitable." Oy! Come on! Preemptive announcements of this sort are a sign of inept management at the top. But they're hardly the hardest and dirtiest thing I can think of an admin official doing. It has always been thus, and will always be. Putting it this way really does make the point seem shrill. And we haven't "just learned" anything about these characters. That also overstates the signficance of the recent move. Finally, Krugman glosses over one point that critics are sure to jump on, which is that the Times reported yesterday that the White House had oked the basic idea. What it was unhappy about was the timing and the tone. So the basic point is right, but leaving out that detail opens up a flank that might have been better guarded.

But still, a great piece.
The International Crisis Group sees problems with the most recent draft of Afghanistan's constitution . . .
Group Cites U.S. Tactics In Many Civilian Deaths (washingtonpost.com)

Here's a WaPo piece based on work by Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch does good, solid work. You can support them here.

(And by the way, the concerns about cluster munitions were on record long before the war. The media didn't pay much attention.)
The UN News Service is reporting that Microsoft will be bringing computer training to refugee camps. The camps will be located in Kenya and Russia. Consult this handy chart to see how long they'll have to work to buy a legal copy of Windows XP.

Whoops! That chart is based on average wage earners, not refugees. Sorry guys! Better luck in the next life!

Thursday, December 11, 2003

I don't know about you, but I'd say that George W. Bush is unelectable.

Ah, I love the smell of fresh Google-bombing in the late Afternoon . . . or something like that.

(I think Atrios started this.)
Via Bookslut: Read this long rant about life at Barnes & Noble.
(In the style of Brad DeLong)

William Kristol and Robert Kagan are shrill.
The latest from Secrecy News:
CIA VETOES RELEASE OF 1968 PRESIDENTIAL BRIEF

Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet has intervened to prevent the partial declassification of a 1968 issue of the President's Daily Brief, overruling for the first time an interagency panel that had ordered release of the document.

DCI Tenet invoked the authority that was granted by a March 2003 Bush executive order which permits him to block the declassification decisions of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel.

Independent historian Peter Pesavento had requested declassification of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) dated November 26, 1968 because it reportedly discusses the status and implications of the Soviet manned lunar program, a subject of his current research interest.

Remarkably, the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), an executive branch body composed of representatives of five member agencies that considers declassification appeals, sided with Pesavento and voted in favor of partial declassification of the requested PDB. That is, a majority of the panel rejected the CIA's position and said the document could be safely disclosed in part.

But then DCI Tenet stepped in to block disclosure. Exercising the new secrecy powers granted him by President Bush for the first time, he vetoed the ISCAP decision.

Pesavento said that, pursuant to the provisions of the executive order, the National Archivist, an ISCAP member, has appealed the DCI's veto to the White House. But to date, no response to the appeal has been received from the White House. Under existing bylaws and orders, there is no deadline for response, ever.

J. William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office and ISCAP executive secretary, today confirmed Pesavento's general account but said he could not discuss it in detail because "it is a subject of pending deliberation."

Trying to imagine CIA's rationale for blocking release of the document, Pesavento speculated that "If this PDB gets okayed for declassification, then this will be the 'opening of the floodgates' it is feared to all PDBs now in the LBJ archives...and beyond...."

In fact, CIA has consistently treated PDBs as sacrosanct and beyond the purview of ordinary mortals. Regardless of their specific contents, the fact that the PDBs served as their intelligence conduit to the President should render them permanently beyond legal access and independent review, the CIA seems to believe.

The CIA approach is far from the ideal of a threat-based information security policy, in which classification is strictly limited to sensitive information that could damage national security. It represents instead a kind of fetishism on the part of CIA officials.

Most recently, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks that is investigating September 11 clashed with the White House over access to PDBs, finally reaching an arrangement for limited access by a subset of Commissioners.

President Bush this year weakened the ISCAP by giving the DCI veto authority over the Panel's decisions to declassify CIA records. See executive order 13292, section 5.3(f):

http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/eoamend.html

The CIA had challenged ISCAP in the past, but in a 1999 opinion the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) determined that ISCAP was authorized by the President to declassify CIA records over CIA objections. That authority has been drastically curtailed by President Bush, leaving CIA free to classify, and over-classify, at will. See the 1999 OLC opinion here:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap/olc_opinion.html

Peter Pesavento and space expert Charles Vick of GlobalSecurity.org are authors of a groundbreaking new study of the Soviet lunar program. Their paper, entitled "The Moon Race 'End Game': A New Assessment of Soviet Crewed Lunar Aspirations," will be published in Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly in three parts beginning in January 2004.

http://www.spacebusiness.com/quest/
Iraqing Their Brains - How can the Democratic candidates escape the trap they set for themselves? By Michael Kinsley

Kinsley, my favourite pundit, has written a surprisingly bad piece on the Democratic candidate's positions on Iraq. Since it's Kinsley, it's not a complete disaster. Everything he touches seems to turn, at least, to silver (or today, to bronze). So here's a nice point:
Another dead-end line of argument is that the war resolution never was intended to lead to war. Goodness, no. War was the last thing anyone had in mind when they voted to authorize a war. The idea was to give Bush enough leverage to work out an acceptable deal and thus avert an actual war. And then Bush ruined everything by going and having a war after all. Who'd have thunk it?
Exactly right. But here's how Kinsley goes after Dean, who leads the pack, according to Kinsley, in consistency:
Among the Democrats, Howard Dean's position is almost coherent. He opposed the war before it started and believes it has not turned out well. There is a tiny question of why Dean bothers to have a "seven-point plan" for Iraq instead of just one point: Bring the troops home. After all, Iraq is less of a threat to international order and its own citizens than when Saddam was in power. If it wasn't worth American lives to improve the situation then, why is it worth more lives now?
But this is just silly. For starters, Iraq is more of a threat to international order now, because it is potentially far less stable than it was before.

Forgive me for being touchy, but my own position is very like the one Kinsley attributes to Dean. And it seems to me that the argument Kinsley makes against it fails rather badly on both moral and prudential grounds. The position "Don't leave Iraq until the job is done properly, since otherwise things will be even worse than they are now" is perfectly compatible with the claim that they shouldn't have gone in in the first place. The world is a different place now that Iraq is occupied and the strategic considerations which suggested that an invasion would be imprudent don't apply in any straightforward way to the current mess. You shouldn't start a fire in your living room. But if someone else is foolish enough to start it over your advice, consistency doesn't require you to abstain from further action. You are now obliged to have quite a bit to do with fires in your living room. In fact, pulling out now and letting Iraq collapse into chaos would be an absolutely terrible result for the U.S. It's just wierd for Kinsley to suggest that Dean's opposition to the war prevents him from saying this.

The moral problem is just as strong. War always brings fresh moral responsibilities. If Dean becomes President he can't dodge these responsibilities any more than he can ignore the other agreements and understandings made by previous administrations on any other subject. Imagine the absurdity of Dean's claiming that he wasn't bound to respect the Fourth Geneva Convention because he had opposed the war. No. He wouldn't and couldn't because as President he would inherit responsibility for the decisions made by past Presidents. And this means he would be bound by the principle: "If you go to war, rightly or wrongly, you can't just walk away when it pleases you and leave an unstable chaos that is likely to result in a brutal civil war."

Sheesh. I guess everyone has bad days.
Wampum: The 2003 Koufax Awards

Wampum is hosting a lefty blog contest. I rather immodestly nominated myself for this post.
I can't resist taking one little crack at Friedman's latest. Friedman writes:
Yes, by destroying Saddam's regime and the real strategic threat posed to Israel by Iraq, the Bush team has taken away one of the strongest security arguments from Israeli hawks: that Israel needs to keep the West Bank, or at least troops on the Jordan River, as a buffer in case Iraq again tries to come through Jordan to strike Israel, as it has done before.
I don't follow this.

First, it seems to me that Iraq wasn't much of a serious threat to Israel before the war. If Iraq had managed to get its hands on nuclear weapons, things would have been quite different, but it hadn't, and wasn't likely to under sanctions. So this never made any sense to me.

But suppose I'm wrong and Iraq was a real threat to Israel. In that case, why should Israel feel any safer now? After all, it would be extremely rash to assume that a pro-Israeli government will come to power in Iraq any time soon. And now that the sanctions have been lifted and a rebuilding effort is underway, Iraq now threatens to become a regional power again. Why should this make anyone in Israel feel safe? Why would they trust U.S. reassurances that a friendly government is going to emerge from the current chaos?
Here's the latest from Human Rights Watch:
Iraq: Law Creating War Crimes Tribunal Flawed
Protections for Legitimate, Credible Trials Needed

(New York, December 11, 2003) -- The law establishing the Iraqi war crimes tribunal lacks essential elements to ensure legitimate and credible trials for perpetrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, Human Rights Watch said. The Iraqi Governing Council yesterday issued a law creating a tribunal to try serious past crimes.

"Iraqis rightly insist that trials for past atrocities are of the utmost importance," said Richard Dicker, director of the International Justice Program at Human Rights Watch. "But any tribunal set up to try these crimes should be fair and effective. Justice must be done and be seen to be done."

Human Rights Watch welcomes the provision of the law that allows for the possibility of appointing non-Iraqi trial and appeals chamber judges with experience in trying serious human rights crimes if the Iraqi Governing Council deems it necessary. The law also includes some important protections for the rights of the accused and applies definitions of international crimes largely consistent with international standards, Human Rights Watch said.

At the same time, key provisions are lacking to ensure credible and legitimate trials, Human Rights Watch said. The law does not require that judges and prosecutors have experience working on complex criminal cases and cases involving serious human rights crimes. Nor does the law permit the appointment of non-Iraqi prosecutors or investigative judges, even if they have relevant experience investigating and prosecuting serious human rights crimes.

"Up until now, the most complex trials in Iraq have lasted no more than a few days," said Dicker. "The law should require that international judges with expertise trying serious human rights crimes sit on the bench alongside Iraqis. This would assist, not replace, Iraqi judges in ensuring justice for the horrific crimes committed."

Human Rights Watch is also concerned that the law does not prohibit the death penalty or trials in absentia, and does not ensure that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the law does not sufficiently address protection of witnesses and victims or security for the tribunal and its staff.

"Allowing the death penalty and trials in absentia sends a message," said Dicker. "The tribunal might be seen as a court of revenge, not justice."

The Iraqi Governing Council issued the tribunal law without providing any opportunity for transparent consultation or public comment. The drafting should have been transparent to help ensure an effective and fair accountability process, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch had recommended that a Group of Experts including Iraqi and international specialists be created to suggest appropriate accountability mechanisms and facilitate collection and preservation of evidence. A mixed Group of Experts would have allowed Iraqi jurists to leverage accumulated international experience in trying serious human rights crimes, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch over the years has engaged in extensive work to document
human rights violations in Iraq and press for justice for these crimes. Human Rights Watch played a particularly active role in documenting crimes committed as part of the Iraqi government's genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988. In 1992, Human Rights Watch obtained and analyzed 18 metric tons of Iraqi state documents. In 1994 and 1995, Human Rights Watch urged states to bring a case against Iraq for genocide against the Kurds before the International Court of Justice.

Human Rights Watch is preparing a detailed analysis of the tribunal law.

To read the Human Rights Watch policy paper, "Ensuring Justice for Iraq:
Evidence Preservation and Fair Trials," see:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/09/iraq091203.htm
There is an interesting question there about the death penalty. On the one hand, I've read that there is an impressive consensus in favour of the death penalty for such cases in Iraq. Perhaps Human Rights Watch overlooks the fact that a tribunal which lacked the power to put people to death might be a serious disappointment to many Iraqis. On the other hand, I'm sympathetic to the reasons HRW gives here.

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Joshua Marshall speculates about the possibility that Baker is already exerting an influence on the Bush admin.

If I were Baker I'd throw a tantrum until Bush agreed to force the Pentagon to take it back. There's nothing like kicking things off with a very public humiliation for people who are standing in your way.

(The more I think about all this, the more I suspect that the Pentagon's move was an attempt to cut off some of Baker's options in dealing with Iraq's debt. This is just the sort of nonsense you get when people at Defense start cross dressing as State Dept officials.)

I intensely dislike Baker, and I think that there are quite serious questions about potential conflicts of interest in this new position. Still, I also agree with Marshall that at least he's extremely competent. He may be the answer to Brad DeLong's question about whether there are any grownups left in the Republican party.
If this is real, I expect to see charges filed.

It's a bit hard to tell what the circumstances are, but it doesn't look as if there was any necessity to kill the man. Even if the area was still too dangerous to evacuate him, or investigate, it's pretty clear he wasn't going anywhere.

Via Abstract Dynamics . . .
Woah! Check out this post by Atrios on questions at the recent debate.
Here's the Carnegie Endowment current Arab Reform Bulletin:
Over the long term, it is almost impossible to have a country that is both unified and democratic when the people of a geographically defined region almost unanimously do not want to be part of that country. By meeting many Kurdish aspirations, a loose federation may be the best hope to hold Iraq together. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the CPA, preoccupied as it is with the deteriorating security environment and with constitutional timetables and modalities, sees any of this.
Yes, that's exactly right.
D-squared Digest -- A fat young man without a good word for anyone has a great post on the timing of the war and the Bush admin's incompetence as a factor in the decision about whether to endorse the war.
OxBlog's David Adesnik has the right idea about yesterday's decision to bar companies from Iraq rebuilding contracts if they hail from countries who were unsupportive of the war. But he also writes:
Coming from an administration that is usually so good about looking for its own self-interest, it is hard to know why no one seems to be watching out for Iraq as the election approaches and voters show more and more concern about the lack of visible progress on the ground.
I'm astonished that anyone still thinks that the administration is good at looking after itself. They're not even good at that. They're actually quite incompetent. This goes well beyond questions of politics. Whatever your political orientation, you should be disgusted by the admin. Indeed, if you're an ideological ally you should be tearing your hair out as you watch the Bush team discredit all your favourite ideas.

There are signs on the right that people are starting to get that. But it's taking an astonishing amount of time to sink in.

A few further points to add to Adesnik's post:

First, many of the allies punished in yesterday's decision are still actively engaged in Afghanistan. This has been a dangerous and costly mission. Where the hell is the recognition for that? Does anyone even remember that? Do the morons sitting at home crowing all day about American sacrifices in Iraq remember?

Second, the decision reinforces the impression that the U.S. thinks it has the right to divy up the spoils of war in pursuit of its own foreign policy agenda. But it doesn't, however tempting it might seem. The resources belong to the people of Iraq, and the U.S. currently (and temporarily) holds them in trust. Decisions about rebuilding ought to reflect that fact.

None of this is to deny that countries should pay some price for arming and supporting Iraq during its long nightmare under S.H. I'm a big fan of debt forgiveness for Iraq. I also think it's absurd and immoral to hold the Iraqi people hostage to debts incurred when they were held hostage by S.H. And I would love a full airing of who gave what to whom and when and with whose permission during the 80s and 90s. But you're not allowed to hyperventilate about this (according to the CY "rules of engagement," of course) until you write on long post about the U.S.'s complicity in the same nasty business.

Finally, the billion dollar question here is whether Baker was informed of this decision before it was made. I'd bet everything I owe that he wasn't, and that he turned very red when he got wind of it. But I'm also guessing that we won't need to speculate for long. Baker knows how to play the media game as well as anyone in Washington, and if there's something damaging here about someone who just made his life harder, we'll learn about it in the next few days.

UPDATE: Forgot to mention the 300 million Canada has promised Iraq. Wonder if Canada will throw a suck now and procrastinate on this promise . . .

SECOND UPDATE: And Canadians think that Bush is a real hoser, eh.

FINAL THOUGHT: And anyway, if it's a real coalition, where were the British in this decision? Were they even consulted? Everyone is talking about this decision as if it's a slap against the countries who failed to support the war on Iraq. But if such an important decision was made without consulting the allies, it's also a slap on them.
I'm astonished. I just read through Safire's latest column and found myself agreeing with basically everything.

I think I'm going to check myself in.
Pentagon Bars Three Nations From Iraq Bids

The headline to this piece in the Times (above) is really quite misleading. More than three countries were barred from Iraq bids. Canada, for example, was barred, and that's huge news up there.

The Times means, of course, that three significant countries were barred from Iraq bids. Well, fine. Russia, France and Germany matter more on this issue than Canada does.

Still, the administration's relationship with Canada has stunk for a long time now, and this move is part of that story. It's amazing that almost none of that filters through the U.S. media.

Tuesday, December 09, 2003

Oxblog's Patrick Belton quotes a WaPo report that funding for Radio Free Europe was recently slashed. Read the quote on the Oxblog site to get a sense of how massively stupid this move was.
The Case of the Misunderstood Memo - The Feith "annex" highlights the Bush administration's misuse of intelligence material. By Daniel Benjamin

Very nice piece in Slate today on the Feith memo and the Weekly Standard's attempt to close the case on the AQ-Iraq question.
More on The Fourth Geneva Convention and Iraq

The other day I asked how the U.S. ever agreed to the Forth Geneva Convention if it rules out the sort of extensive overhaul of an occupied country which people are now claiming is prohibited by the Convention in Iraq. After all, the U.S. was engaged in similar projects in Japan and Germany around the time it signed the Convention.

What got me thinking about this was remembering something Juan Cole had written:

What I don't personally understand is how the privatization can begin under the Anglo-American occupation. I read it as a violation of the fourth Geneva Convention for an occupation authority to alter the character of the occupied society. It is true that there was a Privatization Law under the Baath (which was used to throw private ownership to Saddam's cronies). It would probably be cleaner to put off a major privatization push until a proper Iraqi government is elected, which can make the decisions in light of what is best for the Iraqi citizens that are its constituents. Two of Bremer's people told al-Zaman yesterday that oil nationalization would not be pursued at this time, and that the Iraqi government will retain control of petroleum resources. You betcha. The US has Iraqi production up to 1.7 mn. barrels a day, and is counting on over $3 bn. in revenues from it this year, half of what will be needed to run the Iraqi government and start reconstruction (are US taxpayers paying for the other $3 bn?) All of a sudden, laissez faire folks like Bremer see the wisdom of government ownership of the petroleum industry . . . when they are running a third world government that needs the money!


And see Helen Cobban's remarks on the subject here.

I asked my best friend (a lawyer) to comment on this, and he asked a (very distinguished) former law prof of his (whom I will not name - they just hate that). The answer is roughly as follows. First, all treaty obligations are subordinate to the UN Charter and the UN Charter gives the Security Council extraordinary latitude to do what it deems necessary to preserve and re-establish international peace and security. So this would explain why the U.S. would have agreed to the Convention, as it is interpreted by Cole and Cobban, at a time when the U.S. was embarking on a project to fundamentally restructure two societies. It wouldn't have been undue optimism about the need to remake a society ever again; it would have been optimism that it could get the Security Council to agree to it.

But it's not at all clear that Cole and Cobban are interpreting the Convention properly anyway. The Convention doesn't seem to rule out the current privatization monkey business in absolute terms. In fact, an "imaginative lawyer" - I am told - could fairly easily claim that the obligations imposed on the occupying power require all sorts of measures whose cumulative effect would be quite extensive for the occupied country in any case. In practice, then, the Convention doesn't seem to rule out the sort of ambitious social engineering which we're seeing in Iraq these days.

I should say that I don't doubt that the particular project of social engineering in Iraq now, with all of its messy details, is a disaster. Still, I would rely less on legal grounds for criticism than either Cole and Cobban. There is plenty of material here for straightforwardly moral criticism of various aspects of the occupation. Anyway, pretty much everyone agrees that Iraq is due for, and could really benefit from, more than a modest amount of social engineering at this point. I would push for more enlightened social engineering, rather than less radical social engineering. Then again, things are so bad, I don't know what to think any more.

And, a disclaimer, if you're foolish enough to need it: Nothing in my Jedi training as a philosopher has prepared me to evaluate the claims about international law in this post. I do moral philosophy, not law.
My goodness. 46 hits on Dec. 8th, and only 4 or 5 of those are me (probably another 4 due to my best friend, bored at work).

I'm an international blogging phenomenon!

Monday, December 08, 2003

Shameless plug for my wife, who is a jazz musician. If you live in NYC and are free she has a show coming up. Here's the plug written by her trombonist:

Hello all you two-handed people! Many of you have been pounding those suckers together for years, wondering "When am I gonna get my big break?" Well if you take advantage of our special, once-in-a-lifetime offer, your percussive palms could be featured on

AN INTERNATIONALLY RELEASED LIVE JAZZ ALBUM!!!!

Alls you have to do is come to Greenwich Music House, Sunday Dec 14, 7:30pm, and for the lowlow price of $15 ($10 for scholars and old fogeys), your enthusiastic appreciations will be digitally encoded to a HIGH FIDELITY COMPACT DISC!!!! And folks, thats not all! The more you clap, the more of you there will be for the world to cherish! If you clap for 4 minutes (240 seconds) over the duration of a 90 minute concert by crack jazz unit 4inObjects, assuming 16 bit 44khz sampling rate, your hands will account for over 169,344,000 individual ones and zeros, microsopically etched into hundreds of circular plastic dinguses and perused by WORLD FAMOUS JAZZ CRITICS AND AFFICIANADOS!!!

So mark you calendars and fill your piggy banks! You may want to practice applause at home, just so you can shine during your moment of Glory:

SUNDAY DEC 14th
7:30PM
$10-15
Greenwich House Music School
46 Barrow Street just south of West 4th street off of Seventh Avenue
New York, NY

4inObjects

Yoon Choi - voice
Jacob Garchik - tenor trombone
Jacob Sacks - Steinway concert grand piano
Dave Ambrosio - contrabass viol
Dan Weiss - hits things

Reply if you want tickets in advance. Seating limited. No hecklers or exhibitionists, please. Absentees will recieve guilt.
The UN isn't fair and balanced today:

SHORTFALL IN DONATIONS TO 2003 UN APPEAL FOR NORTH KOREA THREATENS 3.8 MILLION LIVES
New York, Dec 8 2003 4:00PM
Unless this year's Consolidated Appeal for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) receives new pledges by May, countrywide cereal shortages will affect 3.8 million people, especially the 70,000 children who are already at risk of dying from severe malnutrition, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said today.

Quoting a food aid assessment by the UN World Food Programme (WFP), OCHA said the appeal for $225 million is only half funded and, at times this year, up to 3 million people in need of food assistance in the DPRK had to be dropped from WFP distributions.

According to the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 42 per cent of the DPRK's young children are chronically malnourished and 70,000 at high risk of dying if they do not receive critical hospital treatment, OCHA said.

In the northeast DPRK, water is available for only three to four hours a day because electricity is only provided for that period of time, while fuel for heating and cooling is also in short supply, it added.

Due to an industrial decline, people in the provinces of Ryanggang and North and South Hamgyong have been forced into heavy dependence on limited land, resulting in massive deforestation, it said.

The target for next year's Consolidated Appeal for the DPRK will be $221 million, it said.

Of course the starvation and malnutrition is not the result of "an industrial decline" or if it is then naming the proximate cause in the circumstances is sort of obscene. Nor is the "shortfall in donations" really to blame here.

This is far too polite for my taste.
Via Eschaton comes this little tidbit from US News:
Rummy's No. 2
Word is that Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz may bow out as soon as February. Replacement requirements: a strong manager, one who can repair relations with the military and could take over for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Several names have bubbled up, including Deputy White House National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, a former Pentagon assistant, and NASA boss Sean O'Keefe, a former secretary of the Navy.

Steven Hadley?!?! The Stephen Hadley?!?!

Oh boy.


Unqualified Offerings has a damn good question.

I hope the answer is not that there are too many to keep track of.
White House Expresses Concern About Fairness of Russian Elections - from Tampa Bay Online

Via The Agonist.

Wow. I'm surprised and pleased that the Bush administration had the courage to say something, even if the criticism is pretty muted.
The web is a strange place. I complained recently about the design of CLIOPATRIA, a new group blog by a few historians.

A few days later, they cited my criticisms (as a friendly nudge to the design team over at HNN, I assume, and not because I'm especially quotable).

Astonishing and wonderful. I didn't even need to send an email!

I suppose I'm not used to people listening to me, least of all on matters of design.
Boing Boing passes on a chart showing how long people in various countries would have to work to own a copy of WinXP.

OK, I'll stop feeling sorry for myself about my recent computer crash. And I found my (lost) HomeXP disk.

Sunday, December 07, 2003

Naive question of the day: So, there's all this fuss (or at least, some fuss, in some quarters) about the Fourth Geneva Convention and Iraq. The Convention gets cited whenever the U.S. seems to veer too closely to unambiguous instances of collective punishment in response to guerrilla attacks on coalition troops. But the more interesting mentions of the Convention are usually prompted by news of the U.S.'s efforts to fundamentally restructure Iraq's economy. And the point is usually that such overhauls are strictly forbidden by the Convention, blah, blah, blah.

My question is this: The U.S. and Britain are signatories to the Convention, and the Convention dates from around 1949 . . . See the problem? The U.S. was at that time engaged in an extensive, ground up overhaul of German and Japanese societies. So why the heck would they agree to a Convention ruling out exactly that sort of thing they were engaged in when they signed it?

Either I'm misunderstanding the Convention or critics of the U.S. in Iraq are. No? Write me if you understand this. I certainly don't.

AFTERTHOUGHT: And, anyway, why would you want a blanket prohibition on rebuilding societies from the ground up? Sure, it's going to be a terrible idea in most cases, but an absolute prohibition? Why did anyone agree to that in the first place?
I'm lazy and easily distracted, so I didn't bother to think very hard about the little hint Josh Marshall dropped at the end of one of his posts. Marshall is always doing this, and I usually just trust that all will be revealed in the fullness of time. But Swopa over at Needlenose is apparently neither lazy nor easily distracted. Here's a great guess about what Marshall was getting at.
Everyone's been blogging away furiously about same sex marriages. I'm strongly in favour of same sex marriage, but I've been lazy about posts on the subject because I mostly write about international stuff. Also, I'm a Canadian, in case you haven't figured that out (that's why I spell certain words, ahem, properly), and we've already won that battle, more or less. But here, for old time's sake, is a letter I wrote the Minister of Justice last year when he was still waffling on the issue.
Minister Cauchon,

I am writing to register my disapproval of the Minister's recent decision to seek leave to appeal the July 12th, 2002 Ontario Divisional Court ruling on the constitutionality of the common law, opposite sex meaning of marriage.

The Ministry's press release on this issue dated July 29th, 2002 suggests that the Government is reluctant to accept the court's decision because there is, at present, no consensus on the question of same sex marriage. I accept that the issue is a controversial one, but in simply noting its controversiality the Minister sidesteps the substantive moral issue. The current definition of marriage is plainly discriminatory, and is thus incompatible with the Government of Canada's responsibility, noted in the same press release, to ensure equality for all Canadians. The clear intent of the law is to devalue same sex unions by denying them the same legal status as heterosexual unions. If the Minister believes that same sex unions are of lesser value than heterosexual unions, he should say so. Otherwise, he should accept that there is a strong moral claim for treating them equally.

I also note that controversiality as such is not sufficient grounds for denying a basic right such as the right to marry. In a democracy, most issues are obviously at the discretion of the majority, and its representatives, to determine. Nevertheless, our political tradition has long considered other matters, especially deeply personal ones, to be protected from the results of political bargaining. In some quarters, one still hears this refered to as undemocratic. But this objection confuses democracy with majoritarianism. It has been obvious at least from J.S. Mill onwards that a robust respect for democracy is compatible with legal and constitutional protections for minorities.

The Minister's moral failure is compounded by what is almost certainly an error in Constitutional law. The July 29th, 2002 press release cites two legal precedents to support its appeal, but the recent ruling cannot have come as a surprise to either the Minister or his staff. As the Minister knows, recent Supreme Court decisions have made it overwhelmingly likely that the July 12th, 2002 Ontario Divisional Court ruling will be affirmed on appeal. Thus, the only probable effect of the Minister's decision is to impose additional burdens on same sex couples in a pointless attempt to postpone the inevitable. The constitutional background to the Minister's decision adds to the impression that the decision is a cynical one, guided more by politics than either moral or constitutional considerations.

I want to note finally that while the issue obviously touches most closely the lives of same sex couples, it is one that a great many heterosexual Canadians have an interest in. In my own case, reflection on my own marriage has convinced me that the Government denies same sex couples a great good when it denies them the right to marry. Only a generation or two ago in some jurisdications in North America, anti-miscegination laws would have forbidden my own marriage. The current exclusionary definition of marriage that the Minister now seeks to uphold has much in common with such laws. Then, as now, progress was only made when bigots were forced to respect the moral rights of loving, consenting adults to make their own marital choices. The Minister has chosen to stand in the way of similar progress. Get out of the way, Minister Cauchon. Get out of the way.

Not a bad letter, I think, though the ending there is a bit melodrammatic.

While I'm at it, I might as well post a letter I managed to get published in the Toronto Star, back when I was still living in Canada. They published a shorter version than this, but at least they didn't mutilate it. There's a bit of overlap between this and the previous letter, but not too much:

Rosie DiManno's article on gay marriage ("Why mess with cultural success?"; Dec. 16th, 2000) is typical of the treatment that the subject usually receives. After some irrelevant chatter about which hair-styles she prefers, DiManno finally gets to the point. Her argument comes down to the suggestion that a recognition of gay marriage would "force straight society to embrace the gay life." This would weaken it as a symbol of heterosexual union, she claims, and the institution of marriage "means far more" to the straight majority than to gays and lesbians.

As DiManno seems to recognize, society permits heterosexuals an extraordinary degree of latitude in interpreting for themselves the meaning of the institution of marriage. If a man is married in Las Vegas by an Elvis impersonator on roller blades to a woman he has just met, his neighbours may laugh behind his back, his parents may be horrified, and the marriage may be shorter lived than a liberal mandate - but however ill-considered the union, society will recognize the marriage, and recognize the right of the couple to define it largely on their own terms. The legal recognition of such a marriage by society does nothing to "force" anyone to "embrace" a life of foolish heterosexual union. And even if the marriage were part of a trend which did arguably diminish the institution of marriage, many would find intrusion by government into such a personal matter invasive and inappropriate.

On the other hand, to exclude homosexuals from the institution of marriage by invoking considerations largely waived for heterosexuals does amount to discrimination. That - and not a concern about saving the institution of marriage for heterosexuals - is usually the point of the restriction. This is no doubt also the reason that many homosexuals, contrary to DiManno's (bizarre) suggestion, do care about achieving this sort of recognition. Homosexuals who are denied the legal right to marry are denied precisely what heterosexuals gain when they marry: an institution which is a deep source of stability and comfort during difficult times.

DiManno's claim that the courts are legislating marriage out of existence also deserves some remark. The courts are not legislating anything out of existence. They are forcing governments to respect the constitutional rights of homosexuals, as a non-enumerated but analogous group entitled to protection under Section 15 of our Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Since the existing ban on homosexual marriage can only be based on reasons which are waived in the case of heterosexual unions, the Supreme Court is likely to strike down the law sooner or later as discriminatory.

The claim that the court "legislates" when it strikes down discriminatory legislation is also confused. Arguments to this effect frequently make the mistake of supposing that protection from discrimination in a democracy can only legitimately come from a legislature representing the will of the majority. When such protections issue from the legislature the effect is indeed salutary, but - doubts about whether legislatures do represent the will of the majority in Canada aside - to find this the sole legitimate source of such protections is to confuse democracy with majoritarianism. There is a place in a constitutional democracy for minority protections. These protections are meaningless if legislatures are not bound to respect them.

DiManno's column raises a general question about how far we expect government to promote (and discourage) certain conceptions of a good life. Even those of us who are not uniformly impressed by popular morals are often reluctant to see the government intervene in the personal affairs of citizens. If nightclubs or Internet chat rooms were found to weaken the institution of marriage, would DiManno have the government restrict them?

DiManno insists that she has nothing against homosexuals, only against homosexual marriage. But if she denies homosexuals the same legal protections she would insist on for heterosexuals, it is discrimination all the same.
Mmmmmmm. Yummy email address.

public@nytimes.com

That's the email address for the new Times public editor. I'ma gonna put it to good use.
The Miami Herald | 12/04/2003 | Transcript: U.S. OK'd 'dirty war' in Argentina

By now everyone has heard this story. I just wanted to call attention to this great line in one of the pieces I read (linked above):
The document is also certain to further complicate Kissinger's legacy, which has been questioned in recent years as new evidence has emerged on his connection to human-rights violations around the world -- including in Chile, Indonesia and Bangladesh.

I just love that "complicate".
GAP - Global Attention Profiles

More cool maps, this one via Kottke.org.
Don't miss Jim Henley's response to recent reports (the Daily Telegraph had the scoop, if I'm not mistaken) about an Iraqi claiming to the the source of the 45 minute claim.

Unless there's really solid follow-up on this story, I'm with Henley. The guy comes off as a desperate fraud, even though the Telegraph is clearly delighted with its find.
Oh thank God! Blogger is finally back after having been down all day - all day!. I've been distraught.

I'll catch up. Don't you worry.

Saturday, December 06, 2003

Kerry is reported to have said recently that Bush "fucked up" in Iraq.

Well, duh.

But anyway. If you're a Republican, and you can think two moves ahead, do you really want to jump all over this? Do we have to pull out the old Bush "pussy" story again?

True, that's not a story dating from Bush's presidential run, but it is a more vulgar word, if you ask me . . . (Not that either word gets me blushing very deeply.)
Here's the story that everyone is talking about today. It's a Times piece that looks at U.S. strategies in Iraq. Here's the little gem that leapt out at me:
Underlying the new strategy, the Americans say, is the conviction that only a tougher approach will quell the insurgency and that the new strategy must punish not only the guerrillas but also make clear to ordinary Iraqis the cost of not cooperating.

"You have to understand the Arab mind," Capt. Todd Brown, a company commander with the Fourth Infantry Division, said as he stood outside the gates of Abu Hishma. "The only thing they understand is force — force, pride and saving face."

This claim about the "Arab mind" is really popular - I've seen it all over, especially in discussions involving Israel's foreign policy. I don't buy it, of course. But if I were casting about for a racist (culturalist? ethnocentric?) stereotype, I think I'd go looking in the other direction. After all, people who are willing to blow themselves up seem pretty impervious to force, no?

If. When people indulge in these little flights of racist (or whatever) fancy, they rarely seem to ask themselves how they would actually deal if the shoe were on the other foot. I don't see any reason to think that Arabs are any more or less impressed or incensed or intimidated or convinced by force than I am.
JustOneMinute: Tough News Day For The General

Just One Minute takes a crack at Clark. If the NY Times story he quotes is fair, so is his criticism.

This blog is one of the few righty blogs I can stand. It's often wrong, but to be fair it's also occasionally right. And even when I'm grinding my teeth in irritation, I have to admit he can be pretty funny.
The Ballad of Bilbo Baggins

This is profound . . . ly wierd.

Hat tip to . . . aw damn, I can't remember anymore.

UPDATE: Oh yeah, Sapho's Breathing, of course.
CBC News: Mugabe threatens to take Zimbabwe out of Commonwealth

They should kick him out before he leaves.

There's no way to constructively engage this regime. South Africa gave that strategy a long run and the results were extremely disappointing.
Here's Matthew Yglesias on the Geneva Accord:
"The problem is that significant numbers of people don't want a fair solution. Given the relatively small number of rejectionist Israelis and Israel's strong military, it would appear that a government committed to a solution could impose one by force on dissident settler elements without too much trouble. On the Palestinian side, however, this doesn't seem to be true, and the PA has never evinced an ability to destroy the groups that oppose reaching any sort of peace with Israel. As long as that's the case, however, the Palestinians can't actually offer Israelis the thing they want out of a negotiation, so getting a majority, or even the political leadership, behind a deal won't lead to a lasting peace."

That might well be right as far as the Palestinians are concerned. But I think Yglesias seriously underestimates the potential for trouble posed by extremist groups within Israel. Yes, I know about the polls indicating that many settlers would agree to resettle. I think they would, just as I think most Palestinians would accept even a so-so deal. The question is what the hard-core fanatics on either side could and would do.

This is speculative, of course. And I also understand that Israel is committed to tracking down and catching underground extremist groups. But it's a hard business. Notice also that extremist groups within Israel are getting a great deal of what they want now pretty much by laying low. If things swung the other way, I'm guessing (and it's just a guess, of course) that things would get far messier.
If you glace up at the title to my blog, you'll see I've replaced the "Fair and Balanced" with something else. After Rummy made his "long, hard slog" comment about Iraq, I expected to see chatter about someone, somewhere who had adapted his remark in the way I have. But as far as I know no one has.

Friday, December 05, 2003

BBC NEWS | World | Europe | Rumsfeld call for Russia pull-out

Hmmmm. It would indeed be nice to see Russia pull out of Georgia.

Then again, it would also be nice to see the State department in charge of foreign policy.
Gosh, this reminds me of another trip, a long time ago.
Oligopoly Watch has a great post on two recent scandals.

This is a great site, which really doesn't get linked to enough.
TheStar.com - Arar case may be repeated: Cellucci

This story comes via Calpundit, via Jeanne d'Arc. Can I just point out that what the U.S. did in this case probably violated domestic and international law?

When I can expect them to press charges?
Jonah Goldberg: Scrap the U.N., create League of Democracies

Jonah Goldberg means business:

"Let's start from the top. Whether you agree with President Bush or not, it's hard to dispute that in terms of foreign policy he is the most radically pro-democracy president of the 20th century."

Hmmmmm. That is an interesting start. How many ways is this false?

It might be that Goldberg belongs to that crowd of fussy sticklers who never tire of pointing out that the 20th Century wasn't over until the year 2000 was, rather than 1999. And perhaps, retrospectively eager to get the Bush admin going, he dates Bush's administration from the moment it "won" power in 2000, rather than from Bush's inauguration.

But why am I always carping away like that? Let me stop counting mistakes - I'd just be repeating myself, anyway. In the spirit of bi-partisanship and generosity, I'm willing to concede that Bush is the most radically pro-democracy president of the 21st century.

AFTERTHOUGHT: Actually, I've toyed with Goldberg's idea myself in the past. It wouldn't work, though, unless the U.S. was willing to take it seriously even when it got in the way of favoured policies. And what do you think the chances are of Bush agreeing to that? Or anyone taking a bet that Bush would agree to that?
Interesting piece over at Reason about Wolfowitz. I'm not entirely convinced, but I must admit that the author puts his finger on why I feel more ambivalent about Wolfowitz than any of the other neo-cons. Here's a nice bit:

The paradox in this vituperation is that, of all the Administration's high-level policymakers, Wolfowitz is probably the one who is philosophically closest to his own detractors. You could irrigate the planet Mars with the crocodile tears that have been shed for the Iraqi people over the past 18 months, and the war's hawks have been as lachrymose as its doves. Wolfowitz stands out in this milieu by his comparative guilelessness. If consistency of message and purpose is any guide, the Defense Department's number two man is guided, at least in part, by a genuine belief in the very airiest and most Wilsonian ideals that brought about the fall of Saddam Hussein. In interviews, in public statements, in his travel itinerary, Wolfowitz consistently personalizes the Iraqis, cites his own experiences in post-Saddam Iraq, and speaks with passion about the brutality of the late Ba'athist regime.

Well, it's more complicated than that, of course. But the piece is certainly worth a read.
Where is Raed ?

Salam is finally back to blogging . . .
Boy, can Hitchens ever kick the crap out of a straw man! That's the last time it'll look at him with that funny blank look! Here's Hitchens going after more of those caaahraaaaaazy critics of the war. A day or so has passed since the piece appeared in Slate, so I'm assuming that it's already been torn apart by packs of wild bloggers, that pitiless lot. They've no doubt already exposed the difficulties in the piece, and better than I could. But somehow this never stops me from throwing in my two cents. I'm starting to realize that I regard blogging away unknown in much the way that I think of voting: practically, my vote makes little difference, and yet there's both a duty and a privilege (and a small thrill) involved in going through the trouble.

I suppose it was only fair to let Hitchens blow off a little steam after he left the Nation. (This was about the same time I let my own subscription lapse - I always knew exactly what they would say, and omit to say, before I read each issue, so what was the point?) And so he did, in column after column, sometimes unfairly distorting the views of his former comrades, but also occasionally getting the better of an argument. If I can permit myself a little conjecture (and of course I can - it's my blog), it seems likely to me that all this was a very public process of purging himself of views he had previously held. Some of us go into therapy - others write opinion pieces. That would certainly account for some of the animus in his writing. We're often most ferocious with past selves; we know their temptations intimately. (If I were really in a psychoanalytic mood, I would speculate that the full story here involves a reaction to Martin Amis' criticisms of Hitchens in his book on Stalin, a reaction which might have set him even more firmly in his “root out all evil, whatever the cost” mindset. But I'm not in a psychoanalytic mood today, and I may well be wrong.)

But he kept writing in this vein, and he continued to obsess about the stupidest and most simplistic anti-war arguments long after it had stopped being appropriate, and long after he had started to write for a broader audience with very different concerns, and very different objections to the war. The result is that Hitchens writes as if the only people who opposed the war on Iraq were raving mad lefties, labouring under the burden of severe intellectual and moral handicaps. Well, I'm sure there were plenty of those. But of course there were plenty of moral idiots, uninformed blow-hards and raving mad zombies of the right urging the war too, and that was never a reason in itself to resist it. If we care about having a debate, about persuading, about arriving at a sensible view, we have to do better than that.

It cannot have escaped Hitchens - or can it? - that the war was opposed by an extraordinary cross-section of America's foreign policy establishment, right and left, and by a great many people who knew a great deal more about the region than Hitchens (though he's clearly better informed than many who urged on, or dissented from, the war just as loudly as he did). Many of these people had supported the war on Afghanistan, waged quite recently and by the same President in response to the same sort of alleged threat, and against a similarly bleak historical background. Cowardice, moral indifference, a pathological aversion to the application of force - none of these are particularly useful in explaining why so many thoughtful people discovered reasons to dissent so vigorously from the Bush administration's war on Iraq.

I have never doubted that Hitchens' concern for the people of Iraq is deep and genuine, or that his support for the war was based on that concern. In this respect, his writing on Iraq sometimes has a bracing moral vigour which makes it a useful spur for re-evaluation and further reflection. But this does not spare his writings on the same subject from a deep intellectual dishonesty. Polemic is a rough sport, and it's easy to get carried away, especially when the stakes are high, to lose one's temper, to exaggerate, to get lost in point-scoring. This makes it perilous to judge a commentator's work on the basis of a single column, usually produced quickly, and perhaps not representing the best that he's thought on a subject. But the cumulative case against Hitchens is absolutely damning. He appears to be constitutionally incapable of engaging honestly with the more plausible reasons for hating Bush's war, and this failure makes his arguments go cockeyed. Taken as whole it's fair to say that Hitchens' work consistently distorts rather than enlightens; evades rather than engages. And I'm sick of it.

Here - for the record - are what seem to me the more serious difficulties with either side of the debate. If you want me to take you seriously on the subject of the war (I admit, no one seems especially anxious about this - but still), you'd better demonstrate at least a basic awareness of these difficulties.

There was both a prudential and a moral case for the war. The best prudential case was centred on the likelihood that Saddam Hussein had pursued an ambitious weapons program after the departure of the UN inspectors in 1998. The Bush administration's particular claims about Iraq's weapons programs were dubious even before the war, but the basic concern was not at all unreasonable. And who could have guessed that among Saddam's sins sloth would figure so prominently in the story of his downfall? It was not especially plausible to think that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons program, but it was plausible in the extreme to think that Saddam Hussein would have restarted the programs had the inspections regime been lifted. And whatever the apparent successes of the sanctions regime in retrospect, it is important to remember that prior to the war it was widely regarded as a failure, as a costly drain on American resources and diplomatic capital in the region, and as a monumental PR disaster. And because of all this the sanctions regime was slowly crumbling away. This was a real long term threat, and a threat to everybody. A nuclear-armed Iraq would probably have been deterrable, but no sensible person could have looked forward to the gamble.

I think this case for war can be met - met decisively, in fact, because a clear-minded response to the broader problems of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, instability, and human rights disasters in the region saw Iraq as only one part of a larger story, and for all its dangers, not the most dangerous part by a long shot. Allocating so much energy, time, and effort to Iraq drew away resources from the larger problem. The short term results of this experiment have been ominous; I'm afraid the longer term results will prove disastrous. But that's beside the point. If you want to argue against the prudential case for war, here, in outline, is the basic worry you need to address.

There was also a plausible moral case for the war. The Ba'ath regime in Iraq was a wicked one, as vile as any in the world, expect, perhaps, for North Korea. There was little hope of internal change. The Kurds in the North would have been menaced as long as the regime remained in power, and unforeseeable shifts in the balance of power in the region might have undermined U.S. resolve or capacity to protect them. The regime was carrying out an ambitious program of environmental devastation in the South, wiping out an indigenous culture which had survived for well over a millennium (and, in fact, this may be reversed by the U.S. - and just in time). One could go on at considerable length about the regime and it's depredations. It's hard to know what value - what intrinsic value - could attach to the sovereignty of a regime of this sort. And I think it's very hard for anyone who seriously contemplates the situation of Iraqis under the Ba'ath regime to resist the desire to see it vanished from the face of the earth.

(Indeed, I noticed a phenomenon among people who studied Iraq, which I called, awkwardly, Saddamification: There comes a point at which the stories - credible, independently confirmed stories - about Iraq under Saddam Hussein are so awful that some commentators were no longer able to weigh to the pros and cons of invasion very well, because the desire for justice, for retribution, made attempts at dispassionate analysis seem cynical and heartless. I felt some of this myself. While I was teaching a class on the war in Iraq and immersed in the subject I had a number of nightmares (rare, for me) about Saddam Hussein. And many times I devoutly wished him dead and gone.)

What's more, the sanctions regime which featured prominently in most of the alternatives to war imposed very serious hardships on ordinary Iraqis. This was a consequence which the anti-war movement had a difficult time facing.

I think the moral case for the war can be met - though I'm less confident on this point than I am on the prudential question. It can be met, I think, by pointing to two main worries. The first is that the Bush administration manifestly lacked - lacks - the will, or the wisdom, or the discipline, or the smarts, to pull off such a delicate and difficult task. The second worry is that even handled with all the wisdom in the world, the country has been so badly brutalized and for so long that there is a very real possibility of a civil war within the next few years. And then things really will be worse than they were under Saddam Hussein. It was indeed an awful prospect to leave Iraqis to their fates under Saddam Hussein, but, to be blunt, a half-trillion dollars (what the war might well end up costing) might also have been spent on a great many other worthy people who are now left to suffer from malaria, AIDS, poverty, disease and so on. The relevant moral test is not how much better off the Iraqi people are now than they would have been without action - it is how much better off the world as a whole would be if the same resources had been spent other than they were.

This is what the debate on the war should look like, I think, if not in outcome, then at least in the basic kinds of considerations for and against it which were worth taking seriously. People of good will can - and do - differ on the answers to these question. But these are the questions.

Hitchens cares. This is good, and I think distinguishes him from many pundits who clearly don't. But it's not enough to make him a morally serious critic who uses his platform to raise serious questions, meet serious objections, persuade the unpersuaded. Indeed, it hasn't saved him from becoming a cheap partisan hack addicted to bluster and innuendo, who not only fails to persuade, but who fails in the end to even try.
Here's the latest from the invaluable National Security Archive:

National Security Archive Update, December 4, 2003

KISSINGER TO ARGENTINES ON DIRTY WAR: "THE QUICKER YOU SUCCEED THE BETTER"

Newly declassified documents show Secretary of State gave green light to junta, Contradict official line that Argentines "heard only what [they] wanted to hear."

While military dictatorship committed massive human rights abuses in 1976, Kissinger advised "If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better."

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/index.htm

Washington, D.C., 3 December 2003 ­ Newly declassified State Department documents obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act show that in October 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and high ranking U.S. officials gave their full support to the Argentine military junta and urged them to hurry up and finish the "dirty war" before the U.S. Congress cut military aid.

Posted on the Web today at www.nsarchive.org, the new documents are two memoranda of conversations (memcons) with the visiting Argentine foreign minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti ­ one with Kissinger himself on October 7, 1976. At the time, the U.S. Congress was about to approve sanctions against the Argentine regime because of widespread reports of human rights abuses by the junta. A post-junta truth commission found that the Argentine military had "disappeared" at least 10,000 Argentines in the so-called "dirty war" against "subversion" and "terrorists" between 1976 and 1983; human rights groups in Argentina put the number at closer to 30,000.

According to the verbatim memcon, Secretary of State Kissinger told Guzzetti: "Look, our basic attitude is that we would like you to succeed. I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported. What is not understood in the United States is that you have a civil war. We read about human rights problems but not the context. The quicker you succeed the better… The human rights problem is a growing one. Your Ambassador can apprise you. We want a stable situation. We won’t cause you unnecessary difficulties. If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better. Whatever freedoms you could restore would help."

The memcons contradict the official line given by Assistant Secretary of State Harry Shlaudeman in response to complaints from the U.S. ambassador in Buenos Aires that Guzzetti had come back "euphoric" and "convinced that there is no real problem with the USG" over human rights. Shlaudeman cabled, "Guz;etti [sic] heard only what he wanted to hear."

The two new memcons were not among the 4700 documents released in August 2002
by the Argentina Declassification Project of the U.S. Department of State. Much to the credit of Secretary of State Colin Powell and his predecessor, Madeleine Albright, who began the project, that release made front page news in Argentina, contributed dramatically to civilian control of the military, provided documentation on military decision making now being used in court cases related to the "dirty war," and for some of the families of the "disappeared," gave the first available evidence of what had actually happened to their loved ones.

The State Department project, however, did not include documents from the often-vigorous internal U.S. policy debates over Argentina; and neither the CIA nor the Pentagon participated in the declassification effort. Carlos Osorio and Kathleen Costar of the National Security Archive obtained the new memcons in November 2003 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed with the Department of State in November 2002, seeking to fill in the missing pieces from the larger release.

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/index.htm

Now ask yourself: Why is Kissinger not a pariah in this country? Why is he invited on television and respectfully asked for his opinion? Why do newspapers publish his op-ed pieces?

The failure to deal with Kissinger is more than a legal problem - it's a massive cultural problem. Even if it's too late, or politically impossible, or whatever, to press charges for his various misdeeds, it's never too late to shun him, to cast him out of polite society forever. It's never been too late for the political and opinion elite of the country to show a little disgust. But they've never had the guts or the principle for that either.

Thursday, December 04, 2003

Tapestry - Your Favourite Comics by RSS | dwlt.net

Cool! I just discovered this, via metafilter.

(It's really for RSS junkies only - but there's nothing to stop you from becoming an RSS junky today!)
Click here to read an opinion piece by William Kristol and Gary Schmitt on U.S. policy regarding China and Taiwan. The authors seem to have gotten wind of an alarming proposal floating around the NSC to make important concessions to China on Taiwan. Kristol and Schmitt are not happy. Here, I must say, are neo-cons at their best:

First, according to numerous government sources, the senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, James Moriarty, and Doug Paal, the de facto U.S. ambassador to Taiwan, are urging President Bush to declare, privately and perhaps publicly, that the United States opposes Taiwan's independence. This would be a significant change in America's so-called "One-China Policy," a change very much in Beijing's favor.

Until now, the American position on Taiwan's independence has been agnostic. American presidents have said they do not support independence but have also insisted that the cross-Strait issue be settled peacefully and by common agreement of the two sides. The point was that no solution should be imposed on either side. It was also to leave open the possibility that both sides might agree on independence, as indeed might occur were mainland China ever to become democratic (just as Moscow let go of Ukraine after the fall of communism in Russia). If the Bush Administration changes its policy, it will place the United States in opposition to Taiwanese independence even under that scenario. Above all, however, if the administration makes this change, it will strike a severe blow against the vibrant Taiwanese democracy in a kow-tow to Beijing. After the President's recent stirring remarks in favor of democracy worldwide, this move against Taiwan's democracy would be a shameful betrayal of what seemed to be the President's core principle in foreign policy.

Shameful indeed. It's awfully nice to see neo-cons walking the walk on democracy once in a while. It would sure be swell to see them making the same point about Turkmenistan, but never mind that. For now, it would be churlish of me not to praise them for saying stuff like this:

We hope the Bush Administration will pull back from this catastrophic change of course. The Clinton Administration bent to China on the issue of Taiwan as well, but never as dangerously as senior Bush Administration officials are now proposing. Nor so immorally. Taiwan is a thriving democracy. The Beijing government remains a tyranny. Will the Bush administration stifle democracy in Taiwan -- actually demanding that it not hold popular votes -- to curry favor with the dictatorship?

Amen, brothers. Amen.
CLIOPATRIA: A Group Blog

A new group blog which brings together a bunch of historians. . . with absolutely no sense of site design.

Oh yeah, I know, I wouldn't know design if it drummed Yankee Doodle on my forehead with chopsticks. But - uh! - this is so bad that even I notice.

Wednesday, December 03, 2003

What Georgia Taught Us - Washington must stop aiding Central Asia's dictators. By Lutz Kleveman

Don't miss this invaluable piece in Slate today. A sample:

Before the Bush administration congratulates itself on doing the right thing in Georgia, it should be reminded that it is doing all the wrong things elsewhere in the region. In an effort to have allies in the war on terror, Washington has jumped into bed with a number of very unsavory dictators, some nearly as tyrannical as Saddam Hussein. These unholy alliances contradict the Bush administration's claims that it wants to spread democracy to dry up the breeding grounds for angry terrorists. In fact, the Faustian pacts are likely to cause more anger among suffering Central Asians who increasingly embrace virulent anti-Americanism and radical Islam.

Read the whole damn thing.
When Matthew Yglesias shows all due respect, he shows all and only the respect that is due. In this case, there wasn't much due.
Calpundit: Liar's Poker, Iraqi Style

Kevin Drum links to a really nifty game popular in Iraq. It actually sounds like a lot of fun.
washingtonpost.com: How 'Don't Tell' Translates

I didn't realize how many translators with competence in Arabic had been discharged from the military for being gay.

Well . . . at least we have our priorities straight.
A real scandal over at Pepys' Diary:

This morning, observing some things to be laid up not as they should be by the girl, I took a broom and basted her till she cried extremely, which made me vexed, but before I went out I left her appeased.

A broom? I've never had to deal with domestic help myself, so perhaps I'm not in the best position to appreciate the dangers of laxity and overindulgence. Still . . . a broom?!?

Tuesday, December 02, 2003

One of the truly spectacular failures of the Bush admin's foreign policy is its refusal to press Pakistan hard enough on plausible reform measures. Here is the latest from Human Rights Watch:

Pakistan: Threats to Journalists Escalate
Musharraf Comments Bode Ill for Press Freedom

(New York, December 3, 2003) -- Pervez Musharraf's military government is becoming increasingly intolerant of press freedoms in Pakistan, Human Rights Watch charged today in a letter to the Pakistani president.

In the letter, Human Rights Watch highlighted the case of Amir Mir, Senior Assistant Editor of the monthly magazine Herald, whom Musharraf reportedly threatened at a November 20 reception for Pakistani newspaper editors. Musharraf is reported to have condemned the Herald for being "anti-army" and working against the "national interest," and argued that the time had come for the Herald and Mir to be "dealt with." Musharraf's comments reportedly included specific references to stories filed by Mir for the magazine. Two days later, unidentified persons set Amir Mir's car ablaze outside his house. Mir later received a message purporting to be from the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) claiming responsibility for the attack and warning that this was "just the beginning."

"General Musharraf should publicly disassociate himself from the comments about the Herald and order an investigation into the attack on Amir Mir's car," said Brad Adams, executive director of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch. "Instead of creating an environment hostile to the press, it is the responsibility of the Pakistani authorities to protect journalists."

Human Rights Watch also raised the case of Rasheed Azam, a journalist and political activist from Khuzdar in Balochistan province, who was arrested on charges of sedition in August 2002 for publishing a photograph of Pakistan army personnel beating a crowd of Baloch youth. Human Rights Watch has learned that Azam was abused and tortured by members of the Pakistani military, including beatings while hung upside down and sleep deprivation. Azam remains in jail after his bail application was rejected by the district judge. His colleagues have filed a bail application in the
Balochistan High Court that awaits hearing. Human Rights Watch wrote a letter to General Musharraf about Azam on October 10 this year, but to date has received no response.

Since Musharraf's 1999 coup, the Pakistani government has systematically violated the fundamental rights of members of the press corps through threats, harassment, and arbitrary arrests. Many have been detained without charge, mistreated and tortured, and otherwise denied basic due process rights. The government has sought to, and in several cases succeeded in, removing independent journalists from prominent publications. Meanwhile, the arrest of editors and reporters from local and regional newspapers on charges of sedition is becoming increasingly commonplace.

Human Rights Watch urged General Musharraf to demonstrate a commitment to genuine press freedom by releasing journalists arrested on trumped-up charges, and to bring to an end the use of coercion, intimidation and torture in his dealings with the national and regional Pakistani print media.

"It is time for General Musharraf to show the world whether he is a reformer -- or no different from other military rulers," said Adams. "How he deals with press freedoms is a big test. As of now he and his government are failing."

To read the letter to General Musharraf, please see
http://hrw.org/press/2003/12/pakistan-ltr120203.htm
The Russian Reform Monitor reports:

A SENATE PUSH TO REVERSE RUSSIA’S G-8 MEMBERSHIP. U.S. Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Joe Lieberman (D-CT) have introduced legislation urging President George W. Bush to suspend Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized democracies until Russia’s government ends “its assault on political freedom, independent media, and the rule of law,” PHXnews.com reports. The resolution would express the Sense of Congress that the “selective prosecution” of its political opponents, suppression of free media, and commission of widespread atrocities against civilians in Chechnya “do not reflect the minimum standards of democratic governance and rule of law that characterize every other member of the G-8.”

Interesting. Richard Perle was musing about doing just that a week or two ago.

And in this case, I think I agree. It probably won't work, but it's better than simply pretending that everything is swell under Pooty-Poot. The Clinton/Bush policy of looking the other way is totally inadequate. It hasn't worked; it has to go.
Here's the latest from MEMRI:

Jewish Holy Books On Display at the Alexandria Library:
The Torah & the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'

Recently, a manuscript museum opened at the new Alexandria Library, which was renovated by the Egyptian and Italian governments via UNESCO. In the November 17, 2003 issue of the Egyptian weekly Al-Usbu', correspondent Jihan Hussein reported(1) that the museum had added "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" to the display case of the holy books of the monotheistic religions, next to a Torah. The book on display is the first translation of the "Protocols" into Arabic, by Muhammad Khalifa Al-Tunisi, and its binding, according to the report, features "a Star of David, the Bolshevik Jewish symbol, surrounded by symbolic snakes." The following is an interview with the museum's director, Dr. Yousef Ziedan, in which he explains why he decided to add the "Protocols" to the exhibit:

'The Protocols of Zion Are More Important Than the Torah'

"When my eyes fell upon the rare copy of this dangerous book, I decided immediately to place it next to the Torah. Although it is not a monotheistic holy book, it has become one of the sacred [tenets] of the Jews, next to their first constitution, their religious law, [and] their way of life. In other words, it is not merely an ideological or theoretical book.

"Perhaps this book of the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' is more important to the Zionist Jews of the world than the Torah, because they conduct Zionist life according to it... It is only natural to place the book in the framework of an exhibit of Torah [scrolls]."

Dr. Ziedan maintains a website "for heritage and manuscripts" where he posts, among other things, articles that he writes. In his article "WWW and the Informatics Plexus [sic]," Dr. Ziedan writes of the difference between reality and reporting on reality:

"...There is no doubt that every 'news item' originates in a [particular] event, but the distance between the event and the news item is great... I will give an example: When Hitler's atrocities are mentioned, [people] immediately point out the cremation of the Jews in the gas chambers. This happens because of the knowledge that is passed on regarding the Holocaust.

"This is knowledge that has reached the world via a diverse stream of information from journalists' reports, historical research, compensation, [the] unceasing buzz in the media, and films such as Schindler's List which made the entire world cry and which was banned in our country [Egypt] so that we won't cry too over the fate of the poor Jews!"

'Only 1 Million Jews Were Killed by the Nazis... There Wasn't Enough Cyanide'

"What is important is that the information arrived, but what about reality? In reality, 50,000,000 fell victim to the Nazis, among them 1,000,000 Jews and the rest Gypsies, Poles, and other nations. In reality, an analysis of samples from the purported gas chambers has proven that these were sterilization chambers, without a sufficient quantity of cyanide to kill.

"In reality, had Hitler wanted to annihilate the Jews of Europe, he would have. He had an opportunity. The distance between events and widespread knowledge about them is great."

Endnote:
(1) Al-Usbu' (Egypt), November 17, 2003.

Now, people sometimes complain that MEMRI gives a distorted picture of the Middle East. Indeed, I'm sometimes cautiously sympathetic to that view myself.

But gosh durn it, this is not some piddly library in rural Egypt. It's one of the most famous libraries in the world. And they're benefiting from frickin' UNESCO funds. Hats off to MEMRI on this one, I say. I hope a lot of people see it, and the library and its backers get appropriately shamed.

What a disaster. What a stinking disaster.
Google Search: miserable failure

Via Eschaton. George Bush has been google bombed!
Calpundit takes a crack at Kenneth Pollack.

Good, good. It's nice to see Pollack take a bit of flack. His book was quite influential, at least among people of influence, during the debate about the prudence of the war.

Sometime in the next month or so I plan to reread Pollack's book. I think it's important sometimes to read influential policy books after their moment of influence has passed. Doing so can help us to better understand what happened and why. And it add a bit of accountability to the whole business. Pollack is obviously a very clever man, and his book was smarter and more honest (or ass-covering) than the official job to sell the war. But it was also deeply flawed, both intellectually and morally. I'm looking forward to taking it apart again.
The Wall Street Journal's James Taranto writes:

More Mush From the Wimp

"Former President Jimmy Carter called the American invasion of Iraq one of the country's worst foreign policy blunders, and predicted it may take a dozen years to bring stability and democracy to the region," reports the State newspaper of Columbia, S.C. A dozen years? Hmm, Carter took office more than two dozen years ago; if the Middle East can be made stable and democratic in just a dozen years, it's a shame he didn't start the process back then.

I'm not a big fan of Carter's foreign policy, but Taranto's quip seems a bit limp to me. Carter was talking about how long it would take to stabilize Iraq after invading it. It's awkward to try to ding him for a different time frame for a different project in vastly different circumstances, no?

And yet, and yet . . . we can still lament - as Bush did recently - the fact that the U.S. has turned away from democracy all too often in the Middle East. And, yes, Carter was part of that sordid story. But does Taranto really want to go down that road? If he does, I'm not sure he'll end up in a happy place. Was Reagan's performance an improvement on Carter's in this respect? If not, does Taranto want to heap scorn on him too?
Is this really what the Bush admin wants to do now, in the middle of delicate negotiations with other governments over how to handle Iran and North Korea?

I'm the last person to want Iran or North Korea to get nukes. It's not just that they're potentially quite unstable countries led by people I don't at all trust. It's that the more countries with nukes, the greater the chances of miscalcuation and disaster.

Still, for Pete's sake, at what point does a position just become too hypocritical to sustain? If you really believe in non-proliferation, if you noisily trumpet the danger of nuclear weapons, does this carry any corresponding responsibilities to restrain yourself with the same class of weapons?
This looks like the most comprehensive and careful poll done yet in Iraq, and the results are quite heartening, all other things being equal.

I'm still pretty gloomy, though, because political outcomes are about far more than the sum of individual preferences. We'll see . . .
Don't miss this great piece on incarceration and crime in The American Prospect.
Take a break from politics. Check out this really cool post on inflected languages and language change over at Language Log.
The guerrilla leader quoted in this post sure does drive a hard bargain.
Russia scratches the U.S.'s back, and dumps the Kyoto Protocol. Nice to know something came out of that last meeting at the ranch.

“In its current form, the Kyoto Protocol places significant limitations on the economic growth of Russia,” Mr. Putin's economic adviser, Andrei Illarionov, told reporters in the Kremlin. “Of course, in this current form this protocol can't be ratified.”

. . . which is patently untrue. The deal was very, very generous to Russia, though admitedly less useful without the participation of the U.S.
JustOneMinute seems irked by coverage in the Times of recent climbdowns by the Bush admin.

But I wonder if he's missing the point: When you swagger around and talk tough all the time, every concession does begin to look like a sign of weakness. It's hardly fair to blame the media for presenting concessions that way when that's the way you've been presenting them all along. Remember, it's Bush and co. who framed the issue this way, not some hostile media.

And thus I will have my liberal cake and eat it too: I get to poop on Bush for making long overdue concessions AND for looking weak for making them.

Yummy, yummy cake. Mmmmmmm.

Monday, December 01, 2003

Boing Boing: A Directory of Wonderful Things

An update on the angry ipod guy from Boing Boing.
Canada' National Post gives us a reason to avoid dieting.

Jackson Diehl writes of the International Criminal Court:

Though it lacks foolproof safeguards, the risk that it would prosecute a U.S. citizen is pretty small: It is designed to punish war criminals in failed states, not citizens of countries with their own functioning justice systems.

Is that true?

It seems to me that U.S. resistance to the court is based on two concerns: a) The concern that frivilous lawsuits would harrass U.S. policymakers long after they had left office. Enough of these lawsuits might eventually have an influence on the formulation of policy. b) The concern that lawsuits with genuine merit would harrass U.S. policymakers long after they had left office. And enough of these lawsuits might eventually have an influence on the formulation of policy.

As for a), I don't know enough about the design of the ICC to say. But the temptation for abuse is surely going to be very strong. What's more - and perhaps just as important - is that a case doesn't need to be successful in order to generate a huge amount of negative publicity for its intended target. In other words, the ICC could end up being a useful political tool even if all the safeguards actually work. This may be one reason that so many people in the Bush admin think the thing is rotten all the way through.

As for b), I think it speaks volumes about U.S. political culture that a functioning justice system is casually assumed to be sufficient to punish war criminals. As long as Henry Kissinger is a free man I will be doubtful about the U.S.'s ability to apply even the standards of domestic law to its top policymakers, let alone international law. The fact is that the man broke domestic and international law and nothing was ever, or will ever, be done about it. (The problem runs very deep here. It's not just that Kissinger has escaped prosection. It's that he's regularly invited onto television to give his opinion about international matters. It's a cultural problem, as well as a legal one.)

(Just to be clear, I think that most countries in the world find it extremely hard to deal with criminal behaviour among their own policymaking elite. It's not as if the U.S. is alone in this, even if it finds itself rather isolated on the question of the ICC itself.)

Now, this example is not directly relevant to the ICC, since the ICC doesn't consider cases based on events prior to its inception. Still, it isn't just failed states who have trouble dealing effectively and lawfully with criminals who are policymakers, and basing an argument for the ICC on that assumption is no way to win the argument.

On the left we often talk as if the Bush admin's resistance to the ICC is simply willful stubbornness. But I think that officials who resist the ICC know exactly what they're doing. The resistance makes perfect sense if you take the ambitions and the likely effects of the ICC seriously.

UPDATE: A friendly reader complains that I'm not clear enough about "the ambitions and likely effects of the ICC". I just meant the ambition to actually punish people for actually committing crimes against international law, regardless of nationality. That's pretty ambitious. If they were even partway successful at this, the likely effect would be a serious strenthening of the relevant international norms.

Sunday, November 30, 2003

The Hunt for Black Gold Leaves a Stain in Ecuador

Via The Agonist, don't miss this long piece on Texaco's work in Ecuador.

Saturday, November 29, 2003

Now this is just sick.

Couldn't he have waited until Summer?
This week's winner of the "Most Understated Description of Your Own Beating" award goes to Robert Cottrell, for his piece "Putin's Trap", in the New York Review of Books. Here is Cottrell, who has just been describing a subtype of Russian criminal called a "violent entrepreneur":

My work as a foreign correspondent in Moscow ended, probably for good, in October last year, when I encountered two violent entrepreneurs in a pedestrian walkway under Kutuzovsky Prospect, a main road in the west of Moscow where I had an office. A prolonged transaction ensued. I spent the following week in a neurological institute and much of the winter as an outpatient at hospitals and clinics. By Christmas I could open my mouth normally. By March I could write again.

Give the man a hand, folks. A lesser writer might have tried to play up the violence. Cottrell's description is far more chilling for its modesty. And though I have never (Gott sei Dank!) suffered such violence, I imagine that his account quite efficiently conveys the delayed acceptance presumably characteristic of most reactions to violence directed at yourself - the lag between the recognition of the violence, and the awareness that you are the target, that it is real, and not happening to anyone else.

Friday, November 28, 2003

Constitutions, Democracy, and the Rule of Law

Crooked Timber linked to this conference a while ago, but I just got around to listening to one of the papers, the one by G.A. Cohen originally mentioned in the Crooked Timber post. I thought it was quite good, though if you're not used to the conventions of professional philosophy you may find yourself a bit put off by all the logical throat clearing and hair-splitting he does, especially towards the beginning of the paper. Check it out if you have the time (and a high-speed connection).
Jonah Goldberg wonders sarcastically if he's "missing a more uplifting subtext" in reporting on Bush's trip to Iraq. Goldberg remarks, "Wow, I'd largely forgotton how nasty their bias really is." Oh, I'll bet he had. I'll bet the memory of "their" bias had become so distant and hazy that, if not for this monstrosity, Goldberg might have never paid a thought to it again.

Here's the offending story:

By Adam Entous
CRAWFORD, Texas (Reuters) - For a president fond of a tough-guy image, George W. Bush was uneasy when an aide casually asked him, "You want to go to Baghdad?"

With Bush safely back at his Crawford ranch on Friday, White House supporters seized on the U.S. Thanksgiving Day visit to Iraq as a public-relations coup that could boost troop morale and Republican fund raising.

But the trip -- one of the most secretive by any U.S. president -- also highlighted how precarious security remains in the Iraqi capital, captured by U.S. forces in April.

Despite unprecedented precautions, the president slipped into Baghdad under cover of darkness on Thursday to minimize the risk of being targeted by surface-to-air missiles and was confined to the heavily guarded airport throughout his 2-1/2-hour stay.

Now here's what Goldberg needs to understand. The point of mentioning Bush's security precautions is that the U.S. is locked in a dangerous and dirty occupation long after President Chalabi was supposed to be expertly steering Iraq towards recognition of Israel and opening up Iraq's oil fields to American investors. Now, imagine if Clinton - aw, forget it.

As for the implication that Bush is a coward, I'm not sure I see it in the story. But it would have been a perfectly fair point. If you're going to play stunts on aircraft carriers and the like - if you really want to play that game - then your record of skipping military service in the most cowardly way possible (bail out from daddy, rather than running off to Canada, as any self-respecting draft dodger would do) - if, if, if, then by golly, I'ma gonna call you a coward!
Ah, if you haven't had to tangle with lit crit types, perhaps this long post won't be your cup of tea. But if you have, you'll surely enjoy every damn word.
Mark Kleiman has a very interesting post up at Open Source Politics.

Kleiman argues that the progressive critique of Bush's policy on Iraq is flawed in its assumption that preventative war is always wrong. Bush's policies may be bad, Kleiman argues, but they're not bad simply because preventative war is bad as such.

There's a lot to disagree with in Kleiman's piece, but I completely agree with him that we need to rethink a lot of the assumptions we make about preventative war, and about the justification for war in general. It's very healthy at this point to have a debate about exactly when preventative wars are bad and why.

First a little terminology. I assume that Kleiman is using the term "preventative" as a term of art, and so that he intends a contrast with a closely related term of art, "preemptive". A preemptive war is one undertaken when the threat is immanent (in the real, and not Bushian, sense, of the word) - that is, when another party is poised to strike, has made clear its intention to strike, and all other plausible mechanisms for resolving the dispute have failed. The locus classicus of comtemporary discussions of preemption, for better and for worse, is Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars. The classic example of preemptive war is Israel's 1967 preemptive strike on the Egyptian airforce, since it is usually agreed to meet all these criteria.

A preventative war is one that is undertaken without an immanent threat, and is instead based on a plausible forecast of serious danger from another country, whose timing is longer term or uncertain.

There is an impressive consensus, rooted in international law, centuries of moral reflection on war, and common sense that preemptive wars may be just, so long as the conditions are genuinely met. Political rhetoric pays the highest tribute to the doctrine of preemptive war by frequently depicting aggressive war, no matter how unprovoked, as preemptive. There is also a consensus, almost as impressive, that preventative wars are not legitimate.

One reason for this consensus is practical: Because the threat involved in preventative war is vaguer and presumably longer term than the threat involved in a preemptive one, a fair standard for a geninely preventative war can be extremely difficult to draw in practice. This makes the standard easier to abuse. In the wrong hands, it's especially easy to imagine the standard being twisted to justify wars of aggression.

But this kind of worry isn't particularly compelling as a guide to the rightness or wrongness of the principle. A standard's openness to abuse might make us wary about particular applications of it, especially when the statesmen applying it are not disposed to be honest about motives or rationales. But it's in the nature of things that some cases are hard to judge, and if a principle is abused, we should blame the abuser, and those taken in by the abuse, rather than the principle itself.

A more compelling worry is that allowing for the legitimacy of preventative war seems too permissive. Any country with serious rivals has long term reasons to fear those rivals. And this fear is all the more rational - notice - if a country's leadership has reason to believe that the rival country's leadership subscribes to a doctrine of preventative war. If we considered preventative wars legitimate, the worry goes, we would be declaring a very large number of wars justified, at least in principle (though they might be morally bad in a number of other respects). And this seems incompatible with our sense that war ought to be a genuine last resort.

(Consider Iraq's invasion of Iran. The war was quite unjust, both in the justice of its cause and in the manner in which it was fought. But recall that Iraq had very sound reasons to fear Iran in the long run. And while Iraq's invasion may have been rash, there was surely no better time to take on Iran, which was so weakened by internal turmoil. What better, then, to strike at a time of Iraq's choosing, instead of waiting for Iran to regain it's strength. If we want to explain what makes Iraq's war unjust, I think, part of the story will involve the wrongness of preventative war.)

So if we do want to allow that some preventative wars are just, we need to specify a great many further qualifications that will rule out unjust wars which are undertaken for long term strategic reasons. If we can specify these further restrictions clearly enough, we may still be able to make room for the justness of some preventative wars.

It's important not to overestimate the extent to which countries have always been able to take each other by surprise. Still, nuclear weapons do more to challenge the distinction between preemption and prevention than any other development in the history of warfare, and there's no point pretending otherwise. The sheer destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, combined with their ease of deployment, make hostile countries especially dangerous to one another. Add to this the fact that it's often difficult to know how much faith to put in deterrence. Even if he had had nuclear weapons, Saddam Hussein is not likely to have used them, except in the most extreme difficulty. But they would surely have had an emboldening effect on him, and this would have opened up far more chance for miscalculation and error.

What I'm not sure about is how exactly we might rethink the distinction between prevention and preemption. We might argue that nuclear weapons force us to reclassify apparently preventative cases as cases of preemption, but leave intact the moral intuition that preventative war is wrong. Or we might leave the distinction itself intact, but argue that its moral significance has been misunderstood. Or we might simply discard the distinction as completely unhelpful and morally irrelevant.

I suspect that it's better to leave the distinction between preemption and prevention as it is, but to allow, as Kleiman suggests, that there may be special cases in which prevention is legitimate. But I'm still working through all this, and find it very difficult to draw a plausible line.

A few of Kleiman's other points are worth commenting on. First, it's true that Iraq did not hold up it's part of the bargain by submitting to inspections. But the case for war obviously depends on some sense of proportionality between the offence and the punishment. So some further argument is badly needed to demonstrate that war was a just response to Iraq's cheating. I'm also afraid that the situation with inspections was more morally complicated than Kleiman suggests here. For all of Iraq's lies, the U.S. never really played the inspections game straight either. It allowed the inspection team to collection intelligence which was passed along to Israel, for example. I'm very sympathetic to Israel's desire for this intelligence, but this fact gives the lie to the idea that inspections were apolitical and reasonably conducted. And it was also perfectly obvious from the outset of the inspection regime that the U.S. would try to keep inspections in place as long as Saddam Hussein was in power, as a series of top officials all the way up to George Bush Senior made clear.

Also, Kleiman expresses doubt about whether sanctions were really much worse than war. It's very useful to remember how awful the sanctions were, and to face up to the fact that continued sanctions as an alternative to war would have led to further suffering among the Iraqi people. Still, remember that many of the early deaths were due not to sanctions but to the (deliberate) destruction of the civilian infrastructure. And this was an effect of the actual fighting and not the sanctions. Second, there is evidence, collected for example in a UN report released just prior to the war, that the worst of the health crisis in Iraq was over. Both of these points, however, pale in comparison to the third point, which is that if Iraq undergoes a civil war, as I am increasingly afraid it will, then I can say with great confidence that the sanctions were preferable to war.
Matthew Yglesias thinks that Bush's trip to Iraq is a farce. Brad DeLong is much more charitable.

Sorta seems as if he's damned if he does and damned if he doesn't, doesn't it?

So, should we just leave him alone?

Hell, no!

Why, you ask?

Because its Bush's fault in the first place that he's damned if he does and damned if he doesn't! Yeah, it's certainly a nice gesture to fly over and cheer up some troops. (It's not fair to doubt that he cheered up lots of troops. Come on, now.) So I understand DeLong's reaction: All other things being equal, it is a great gesture.

And yet, and yet, all other things are not equal. He shouldn't have to be cheering anyone in Iraq up now. In a better world, there wouldn't have been a war in the first place and he would have been able to fly to Afghanistan to cheer up the troops for having helped to stablize the country and capture bin Laden and co.

And it doesn't help that he's telling all kinds of smarmy lies there (e.g., they're keeping America safe - when invading Iraq did nothing of the sort) and getting a superb photo-op in the process.

Thursday, November 27, 2003

More Gelb bashing, this time from Helena Cobban.

I got my licks in early.
Some holiday fun with Friedman today. Adopting the clever, and entirely unexpected, literary device of pretending to be Saddam Hussein writing a letter to Bush, Friedman writes:

By now you've realized that I was prepared for this war. I got rid of all my W.M.D., hid explosives and set up an underground network to fight you once you were in country. But God bless the Turkish Parliament. By not allowing you to use Turkey to invade from the north, my boys in the Sunni Triangle were spared. By the time you got here from the south, we just receded into the shadows. You occupied our Sunni towns, but never defeated them. Had you been able to sweep down from the north, my boys would have had to engage you, and you would have killed them wholesale by the hundreds. Now you have to kill them retail — one by one.

Friedman sure can pack a lot of nonsense into a short paragraph. It's hard to know where to begin.

Friedman supposes that S.H.'s grand plot involved getting rid of W.M.D., rather than, say, supposing that if he kept most of his brutality directed inward he would be left alone. (No one else is going to make that mistake again soon! Get working on your W.M.D. everyone!)

I also expect that S.H's preparation for an overthrow was far less developed than Friedman thinks, if it was developed at all. I don't think S.H. planned, for example, to have weapons caches lying around unguarded long after the downfall of the government so that insurgents could restock when supplies dwindled.

It may be comforting to portray your own incompetence as your enemy's evil genius, but it's not especially helpful if you're trying to figure out what is actually happening.

What really caught my interest, though, is that Friedman wants to pin the blame for much of the postwar situation on Turkey. This is a very convenient explanation for the whole mess in Iraq. In fact, it's so convenient that I'm astonished I haven't seen more of this line. Hell, it's so damn convenient, I'm going to bet that it becomes enshrined as a major article of faith among the pro-war camp. I'll bet that years from now we'll be hearing people defensively refering to the oasis of democracy that the Middle East might have been if only Turkey hadn't gone and ruined everything.

So I might as well take my first crack at it, even though it won't do any good.

I do agree that the war would probably have gone more smoothly if troops had been able to go in through the North as well as the South. But many of the postwar problems also appear to stem from entirely different causes, among them the failure to provide enough troops to properly secure areas once the fighting was over. That ain't Turkey's fault.

Friedman seems to think that this magnificent sweep from the North would have wiped out the bulk of what currently ails Iraq, but it's now obvious that resistance to a U.S. occupation runs very deep in the Sunni triangle (for example). There are many tens of thousands of angry young men in Iraq now. I'm not sure how much difference killing "hundreds" of them would have made, especially when they would have left behind brothers and friends and parents to avenge them. Better, if I can offer a little advice, to keep an eye on enormous caches of weapons that seem to be lying around unguarded a lot of the time.

Anyway, if S.H. planned the whole damn thing, as Friedman suggests, wouldn't he have given the orders for those troops to melt away before they could get pulverized? Or is his evil genius only selective? May we invoke it to get ourselves off the hook and reinvoke it when we're casting blame at others?

Set that aside, though. Orders or no orders, one would have thought that many of these troups would have had the sense to melt away rather than risk a direct confrontation with the U.S. as it swept down from the North. But don't take my word for it: that's what a lot of them did when the U.S. came in from the South, isn't it?

But if we're playing the blame game, it's worth taking a closer look at how Friedman keeps score. Friedman assumes the essential rightness of U.S. behaviour and then rates other country's actions depending on how well they fit with its plans. Well, of course if you do that Turkey comes off looking pretty bad. But if the U.S. has no right in Iraq in the first place, if the venture was dishonestly sold and contrary and international law, why assume that it's the failure of others to cooperate that's to blame when things go wrong?

Wednesday, November 26, 2003

Abu Aardvark tries to imagine Michael Ledeen locked in a room with Laurie Mylroie:

Michael Ledeen, who can easily match Laurie Mylroie for obsessiveness (can you imagine the two of them locked in a room? Saddam is the source of all evil! No, Tehran is the source of all evil! Saddam bombed Khobar! No, the Iranians did! Saddam was behind 9/11! No, Iran was! Hey, maybe Saddam was actually an Iranian agent, and that whole 8 year war in the 1980s was just an elaborate ruse to pull the wool over America's eyes - you guys ever think of that?)...

Myself, I prefer to imagine them trying to set up a meeting: "Hey, I'll have the voices in my head talk to the voices in your head, and we'll set something up . . ."
The latest from Human Rights Watch, if you can stomach it:

Sudan: Oil Companies Complicit in Rights Abuses

(London, November 25, 2003) The Sudanese government's efforts to control oilfields in the war-torn south have resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Foreign oil companies operating in Sudan have been complicit in this displacement, and the death and destruction that have accompanied it.

The report, "Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights," investigates the role that oil has played in Sudan's civil war. This 754-page report is the most comprehensive examination yet published of the links between natural-resource exploitation and human rights abuses.

"Oil development in southern Sudan should have been a cause of rejoicing for Sudan's people," said Jemera Rone, Sudan researcher for Human Rights Watch. "Instead, it has brought them nothing but woe."

The report documents how the government has used the roads, bridges and airfields built by the oil companies as a means for it to launch attacks on civilians in the southern oil region of Western Upper Nile (also known as Unity state). In addition to its regular army, the government has deployed militant Islamist militias to prosecute the war, and has armed southern factions in a policy of ethnic manipulation and destabilization.

Human Rights Watch urged that the current peace negotiations deal comprehensively with the legacy of Sudan's oil war, particularly the ethnic divisions that persist in oilfields of the south and threaten the long-term peace.

The report provides evidence of the complicity of oil companies in the human rights abuses. Oil company executives turned a blind eye to well-reported government attacks on civilian targets, including aerial bombing of hospitals, churches, relief operations and schools.

"Oil companies operating in Sudan were aware of the killing, bombing, and looting that took place in the south, all in the name of opening up the oilfields," said Rone. "These facts were repeatedly brought to their attention in public and private meetings, but they continued to operate and make a profit as the devastation went on."

Conditions for civilians in the oilfields actually worsened when the Canadian company Talisman Energy Inc. and the Swedish company Lundin Oil AB were lead partners in two concessions in southern Sudan. Amid mounting pressure from rights groups, Talisman sold its interest in its Sudanese concessions in late 2002, and Lundin followed in June.

These Western-based corporations were replaced by the state-owned oil companies of China and Malaysia- CNPC, or China National Petroleum Corp., and Petronas, or Petrolium Nasional Berhad-which had already been partners with Talisman and Lundin. Following CNPC and Petronas, a third state-owned Asian oil company, India's ONGC Videsh Ltd., began operations in Sudan.

Statistics from the Sudanese government and the oil companies show how the major share (60 percent) of the US$580 million received in oil revenue by this poverty-stricken country in 2001 was absorbed by its military, both for foreign weapons purchases and for the development of a domestic arms industry.

"The Sudanese government has used the oil money in conducting scorched-earth campaigns to drive hundreds of thousands of farmers and pastoralists from their homes atop the oil fields," said Rone. "These civilians have not been compensated nor relocated peacefully-far from it. Instead, government forces have looted their cattle and grain, and destroyed their homes and villages, killed and injured their relatives, and even prevented emergency relief agencies from bringing any assistance to them."

The 20-year civil war in Sudan has been fought between the Islamist, northern-based Arab-speaking government and the vast marginalized African populations of southern Sudan, where the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has been the largest rebel group. The war spread to eastern and central Sudan, and while the parties signed a cease-fire agreement in October 2002 western Sudan remains engulfed in war.

The report also covers the SPLM/A's role in the struggle over oilfields. The regular SPLM/A forces have carried out serious human rights abuses, including summary execution of captured combatants. Commanding officers of the SPLM/A have taken no steps to investigate or punish these crimes.

Peace talks promoted by a troika of the United States, Britain and Norway have been underway in Kenya since June 2002. However, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A, the only parties to the talks, have yet to agree on how to share revenue from the oil reserves, most of which lie in the south. The northern-based government has agreed to a self-determination referendum for the south, but not until 6 1/2 years after the peace agreement is signed.

"The hundreds of thousands of persons displaced from the oilfields should be allowed to return, with guarantees of safety and compensation for their losses," Rone said. "This needs to be a central part of the peace agreement."

Related Material

Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights
Report, November 2003 available online at:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/

Sudan: Human Rights and Political Inclusion Must Be Part of Sudan Peace Agreement
Briefing Paper, September 2003
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/sudan091703-bck.htm
Via Metafilter: Find out how rich you are

Turns out I'm wa-hay rich!
David Adesnik, over at Oxblog quotes a friend in response to Gelb's piece in the times yesterday (for my take on Gelb, click here):

Iraq is unique in the Muslim world as a country where Sunnis and Shias, both secular and religious leaders, have often collaborated against internal oppression and external aggression, and have not engaged in the vicious sectarian bloodshed seen in Pakistan, or the Wahabbi view of Shias as heretics and polytheists. Shia Ayatollahs supported Sunni opposition movements, and a radical Shia movement like the Da’wa party had a Sunni membership of ten percent...

Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias are related by common history and often common tribal relations, since Iraq only became a majority Shia state after Sunni tribes converted to Shiism in the 18th century. Even the most extreme Iraqi Shias are Iraqi nationalists and view Iran with suspicion. Iraqi Shias believe their country is the rightful leader of the Shia world, since Shiism began in Iraq, most sacred Shia sites are in Iraq and the Hawza, or Shia clerical academy of Najaf, dominated Shia thought until recently. Iran is a rival for them. Iraqi nationalism and unity were proven when all members of the Iraqi Governing Council unanimously rejected the American proposal to introduce Turkish peacekeepers into the country...

Kurdish leaders from all political parties have called for inclusion in the new Iraq, and while many may dream of an eventual Kurdish state, all recognize that it is quixotic at this juncture. There is only a light American presence in Kurdistan anyway, and it is not the reason troops are meeting resistance elsewhere. A Kurdistan without US troops is the greatest fear of most Kurds today who live under the ominous shadow of their Turkish, Iranian, and even Syrian neighbors. There is no clear border for Kurdistan. Kurds covet Mosul and Kirkuk, where many Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen would violently oppose secession...

Gelb’s proposal is the singularly least democratic suggestion offered to solve the Iraq crisis to date. Moreover, no neighboring country would accept the idea of dividing Iraq. How many small, artificial and unviable countries (like Jordan and the Gulf countries) does the west wish to create in repetition of its post Ottoman errors? Unlike Yugoslavia, Iraq’s different groups have no history of separate existence and they have no history of mutual slaughter. It is true that Iraq was to a certain extent an invention. But all states begin as an imagined idea. A state succeeds if its people believe in it. Iraqis believe in Iraq. If anything, the American occupation is only uniting Iraqis in resentment of the foreigners and non Muslims who
rule them, and increasing their desire to be “free, independent and democratic” as the graffiti says on walls throughout the country. Iraqis believe in Baghdad, an extremely diverse capital city, where Shias, Sunnis and Kurds live together and even intermarry.

I agree with the main sentiment expressed final paragraph, certainly. If I can add a pessimistic note, the author seems to assume that past ethnic harmony in Iraq (arguably overstated by the author) gives us a reason to hope that Iraq will continue to enjoy a reasonable amount of ethnic harmony in the future.

But past ethnic harmony is a good predictor of future ethnic conflict only if ethnic conflict is mainly about, um, ethnic conflict. I think it isn't.

What do I mean? In many cases - Yugoslavia is an excellent example - the real causes of ethnic conflict have less to do with ethnic hatreds than may seem the case. It's often far more plausible to see the causes as political, as having to do with the struggle for control over wealth and power. My sense is that the trouble in Yugoslavia had much more to do with the mafia and the struggle for control over state resources than with an eruption of long dormant ethnic hatred. And it is worth pointing out that Yugoslavia had the highest rate of intermarriage between ethnic groups in the world in the year before the ethnic cleansing started. Of course, recognizable ethnic groups are needed to get things going, and past grievances certainly help. Once things gets going, ethnic identity becomes the surest shortcut to figuring out who is safe and who is not - and this helps to fuel the impression that the conflict is, at root, an ethnic one.

This matters because it influences our sense of how likely an ethnic conflict is to erupt somewhere. Instead of asking whether there is a history of ethnic cooperation or conflict, it is probably more helpful to ask: Are there pre-existing ethnic divisions which might be exploited by unscrupulous leaders? How high are the stakes in the struggle over control of the state? What other legitimate kinds of groups exist besides ethnic categories (unions, associations, multi-ethnic political parties, etc.)?

I'm pessimistic because I think the answers to these questions are not encouraging, and because I think they matter more than the fact - to the extent that it is a fact - that Iraq has a history of ethnic cooperation.

Gelb is mistaken, I think. But make no mistake, the U.S. will need to work very hard to avoid a civil war.
Anyone with an insatiable appetite for current Iraqi politics should be sure to read this post by Juan Cole. Abu Aardvark has interesting things to say about the same topic as well.
Ayn Rand Admirers - The Atlasphere - Ayn Rand, Fountainhead, Atlas Shrugged, Objectivism

Oh lordy. Via Reason magazine's Hit and Run comes word of . . . . a dating service for admirers of Ayn Rand.

I'm trying to think of something funny to say about this, but I think this plenty funny by itself.
Chaplain's Release Comes With New Charges (washingtonpost.com)

I feel much, much safer knowing that John Ashcroft will not rest until everyone with porn on their laptop is brought to justice (and treated to a bit of public humiliation!).
Will I sulk on Thanksgiving? Will I pout? Will I whine? Will I gripe?

By golly, I will!

My otherwise wonderful wife won't let us have a turducken!
And now for something completely different . . . .

If you like Jazz and live in New York City, you may like this:

4inobjects

Jacob Sacks - piano
Yoon Choi - voice
Jacob Garchik - trombone
Dave Ambrosio - bass
Gerald Cleaver - drums

55 bar
55 christopher Street near 7th Ave and w4th st
West Village

Tuesday, Dec 2nd
8pm
One set only
no cover

[Full disclosure: I'm married to the "voice"]

Tuesday, November 25, 2003

Ew! Check out Bush's attack ad here. I feel dirty just linking to it!

It's amazing what a lousy speaker Bush is. People have already noticed that the ad has been overdubbed to correct a slip of the tongue (which apparently raises interesting legal questions). I wonder why they didn't overdub the next bit, in which Bush stumbles over his words.

Slate has an angry response to the ad, if you're not feeling angry enough already.
Leslie Gelb, President emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former columnist for the New York Times, has a piece in today's Times that deserves, and will no doubt receive, lengthy comment. Gelb argues that the current thinking on Iraq is flawed because it assumes that whatever the character of a future Iraq, it must be a single state. On the contrary, Gelb thinks, Iraq was only held together as a state in the past by brute force. Better to move, then, to a three state solution, with the Kurds in the North, the Sunni Arabs in the central part of the country and the Shiites in the South.

For an early reaction to Gelb's piece, see Juan Cole's remarks here. Cole, I think, is mainly right about Gelb. I just have a few points to add.

First, I'm not sure why Cole is so confident that oil reserves in Northern Iraq are so close to being depleted. I'd be curious to know why Cole thinks that, especially since oil exploration and development have been almost completely neglected for the last two and a half decades.

Second, both Gelb and Cole seem too quick on the Turkish question. Gelb basically seems to think that the Turks will just suck it up if the Kurds separate, while Cole flat out asserts the contrary. But surely the reaction will depend on all kinds of variables: to name just a few, the length of time between now and a proposed separation, the situation in South East Turkey, Turkey's relationship with Europe and the U.S. at the time, the U.S.'s estimation of the costs and benefits involved in each policy, and so on.

The thing that is really striking about Gelb's piece is its arrogance. Gelb speaks of various minorities and interests in Iraq as though they are chess pieces on a board, rather than groups of human beings with legitimate interests in own right. With a few modifications, Gelb's piece could pass as an artifact of the colonial era, when Western powers carved up with the world without entertaining the slightest doubts about their own judgment or wisdom.

The trick, as far as Gelb is concerned, is to find the cleverest way to move the pieces about the board. Why not, for example, starve the Sunnis of oil revenues to bring them to heel?:

"The United States could extricate most of its forces from the so-called Sunni Triangle, north and west of Baghdad, largely freeing American forces from fighting a costly war they might not win. American officials could then wait for the troublesome and domineering Sunnis, without oil or oil revenues, to moderate their ambitions or suffer the consequences."

Or why not facilitate ethnic cleansing throughout Iraq?

"For example, [the Sunnis] might punish the substantial minorities left in the center, particularly the large Kurdish and Shiite populations in Baghdad. These minorities must have the time and the wherewithal to organize and make their deals, or go either north or south. This would be a messy and dangerous enterprise, but the United States would and should pay for the population movements and protect the process with force."

No. This won't do. This kind of brutal calculating is almost always too clever by half. And Gelb's talk of various political arrangements as "natural" or "unnatural" disguises a plain contempt for the wishes of ordinary Iraqis about the shape of their future political arrangements.

Gelb's piece is a reminder that the capacity for moral engagement with a topic has deep connections with our ability to think prudentially about it. I'm not saying that if you're a good person, it'll be easy to figure out what to do. Nor I am saying, exactly, that immoral people always make prudential mistakes. I do think, though, that the capacity for moral reflection is very closely connected with our capacity to imagine what it is like to be differently situated than we are. Moral emotions and concerns can highlight aspects of a situation that are likely to be given more significance by other people, and that we're liable to miss if we're narrowly focused on the pursuit of our own interests. And this can be valuable when we assess how people are likely to respond to our behaviour. I don't know what Gelb is like as a person - perhaps he's a swell chap. But to judge from his piece, he hasn't bothered to imagine what it must be like to be an Iraqi now. And it shows in his grasp of the strategic situation in Iraq, and his sense of how things are likely to play out there.

There are no easy solutions in Iraq's future, and Gelb is right to point to powerful forces working against a unified state. Indeed, I am most terrified now of a civil war tearing apart a new Iraq within a year or so of a U.S. departure.

I also don't want to argue that a unified state is the best or only solution for Iraq. I think that's a matter for Iraqis to decide, if things ever reach the point at which a democratic process might legitimately help them sort through the options.

What I am arguing is that Gelb's article embodies the sort of arrogance that mars so much U.S. foreign policy thinking. This arrogance has (deservedly) come to be associated with the Bush administration, but it obviously runs much deeper than that. Gelb isn't some bozo the Times picked off the street. He's at the very centre of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. That he can talk so casually about other countries, other lives, in this way, ought to be an occasion for much soul searching.
Here's the latest from the National Security Archive:

National Security Archive Update, November 24, 2003

KENNEDY SOUGHT DIALOGUE WITH CUBA

INITIATIVE WITH CASTRO ABORTED BY ASSASSINATION, DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHOW

Oval Office Tape Reveals Strategy to hold clandestine Meeting in Havana; Documents record role of ABC News correspondent Lisa Howard as secret intermediary in Rapprochement effort

For more information contact:
Peter Kornbluh - 202/994-7116
email - pkorn@gwu.edu

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB103/index.htm

Washington D.C. - On the 40th anniversary of the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and the eve of the broadcast of a new documentary film on Kennedy and Castro, the National Security Archive today posted an audio tape of the President and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussing the possibility of a secret meeting in Havana with Castro. The tape, dated only seventeen days before Kennedy was shot in Dallas, records a briefing from Bundy on Castro's invitation to a U.S. official at the United Nations, William Attwood, to come to Havana for secret talks on improving relations with Washington. The tape shows President Kennedy's approval if official U.S.
involvement could be plausibly denied.

The possibility of a meeting in Havana evolved from a shift in the President's thinking on the possibility of what declassified White House records called "an accommodation with Castro" in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Proposals from Bundy's office in the spring of 1963 called for pursuing "the sweet approach…enticing Castro over to us," as a potentially more successful policy than CIA covert efforts to overthrow his regime. Top Secret White House memos record Kennedy's position that "we should start thinking along more flexible lines" and that "the president, himself, is very interested in [the prospect for negotiations]." Castro, too, appeared interested. In a May 1963 ABC News special on Cuba, Castro told correspondent Lisa Howard that he considered a rapprochement with Washington "possible if the United States government wishes it. In that case," he said, "we would be agreed to seek and find a basis" for improved relations.

The untold story of the Kennedy-Castro effort to seek an accommodation is the subject of a new documentary film, KENNEDY AND CASTRO: THE SECRET HISTORY, broadcast on the Discovery/Times cable channel on November 25 at 8pm. The documentary film, which focuses on Ms. Howard's role as a secret intermediary in the effort toward dialogue, was based on an article -- "JFK and Castro: The Secret Quest for Accommodation" -- written by Archive Senior Analyst Peter Kornbluh in the magazine, Cigar Aficionado. Kornbluh served as consulting producer and provided key declassified documents that are highlighted in the film. "The documents show that JFK clearly wanted to change the framework of hostile U.S. relations with Cuba," according to Kornbluh. "His assassination,
at the very moment this initiative was coming to fruition, leaves a major 'what if' in the ensuing history of the U.S. conflict with Cuba."

Please follow the link below:

http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB103/index.htm

Monday, November 24, 2003

I'm sure everyone in the blogosphere has already heard about this, but just in case . . . this handy website promises to turn NY Times article links into permalinks.

Anything that helps to postpone linkrot, I suppose . . . .
Random links . . .

Phil Carter at Intel Dump sifts through the latest signs of a drop in reenlistment among reserves.

Steve at No More Mister Nice Blog wonders where Friedman gets off with his latest column. Friedman's latest muses about whether Americans are losing their nerve for fear of terrorist attacks. Excuse me, Mr. Friedman, but aren't you the guy who wrote that another September 11th would mean the death of civil liberties in the U.S.? (I'm relying on memory here, but I'm pretty sure that's what he said.)

And Safire goes off the rails . . . again. Here's his take on the Feith memo:

But with so much connective tissue exposed — some the result of "custodial interviews" of prisoners — the burden of proof has shifted to those still grimly in denial.

The "grimly in detail" bit is just so silly. At what point do the NY Times fact checkers have to weigh in on Safire's columns? I wonder what it would take. If I'd been working there, I think I would have melted down at Safire's recent claim that Americans have "supported the Kurdish cause through thick and thin". For the love of Pete, it's like some kind of sick joke or something.

Brian Keefer at Spinsanity took some shots at silly responses to the Feith memo, but Safire's column was presumably too late to be included in the rundown of distortions, errors, and falsehoods.
iPod's Dirty Secret - Neistat Brothers

Do we have too much time on our hands?

Remind me not to piss this guy off.

Also remind me not to buy an ipod unless this site is thoroughly debunked or Apple changes its policies.
Random Link Roundup

In Iraq, a recent bombing in the Northern city of Mosul renewed fears of a spreading insurgency.

The WaPo says that the military is taking a fresh look at the need for a force devoted to peacekeeping. The story notes strong resistance to the idea in the past, both within the Bush administration and within the army.

Conservative pundit watch: Mark Kleiman points out that Rush Limbaugh is in bigger trouble than he seems to think. Meanwhile, Triumph the Insult Comic Dog poops on Bill O'Reilly.

Meanwhile, the world's only known albino gorilla has passed away. And check out these cool Soviet era anti-alcohol posters (via Kottke.org)

Sunday, November 23, 2003

Rapport Between Bush, Bremer Grows (washingtonpost.com)

Here's the funniest graf in this piece:

Bremer's style, direct and briskly decisive, also appeals to Bush. "When you deal with Jerry, you don't have to worry about what he says behind your back. He tells you exactly what he thinks," said former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who has worked with Bremer since the 1970s.

Either the authors are dolts, or this is a sly way of insinuating the opposite of what Kissinger says. This is a little bit like getting the Grinch to vouch for your Christmas cheer.
Via the Beltway Bandit:

Guardian Unlimited | Special reports | War critics astonished as US hawk admits invasion was illegal

Wish he'd said that before the war. . . .

For what it's worth, I don't think that international law has some sort of absolute moral standing. It might be morally acceptable, or even obligatory, to violate it in certain circumstances - just as it might be acceptable or obligatory to violate domestic law in some circumstances. But it was relevant, and it deserved to be weighed in the balance.

As I've pointed out in the past, when we're assessing the case for war, we need to take ALL the relevant costs and benefits into account. And if lying or omitting crucial details is necessary to sell a war, that will have a great many effects which need to be considered.

Friday, November 21, 2003

I've just finished reading the piece on Cheney in the New Republic that everyone is raving about. The piece makes a number of interesting points, the most important of which, I think, is that there are some good reasons for doubting the CIA's judgment.

But the piece also throws its weight behind the idea that Cheney is a thoroughgoing neo-con, rather than an aggressive nationalist. Although the two schools agree on many things, the philosophical differences can be important, especially on the subject of democracy.

I simply can't swallow the claim that Cheney has cared for a number of years about promoting democracy around the world. Examine U.S. foreign policy with respect to Egypt, Venezuala, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and so on and on – and examine it especially before Sept. 11th, and . . . well, concern about human rights and democracy, if it is there at all, is consistently subordinated to other priorities.

How do you tell what someone believes, if you're not inclined to believe his own testimony about it? Well, look at the choices he makes. Look at how he handles conflicts between competing goals. And then experiment with different hypotheses about what underlying values and assumptions best explain that pattern of behaviour.

If you do this with the Bush White House – and Cheney is, as the story points out, a driving force behind the development of its foreign policy – it's just very hard to buy the line that Cheney gives a crap about democracy.

It's very hard, but it's not impossible. Suppose that Cheney does care about democracy? What other assumptions do we have to make to square it with his behaviour? I think in that case we have to assume that he's very, very stupid.

Of course, he might be both . . .
If Friedman or Safire were bloggers, I'd just ignore them. But they aren't just bloggers - they get the regular opportunity to sound off on one of the most widely read and influential opinion pages in the world. That's why it's worth taking the trouble to point out some of the more stupid things they say, even if there's not much sport in it.

Here's Swopa at Needlenose slamming Friedman for going from arguing P to not-P without noticing it, and in the space of a month or two.

Thursday, November 20, 2003

Email back . . . Computer healing (slowly). . . I'll be back in full swing in a few days.

Meanwhile, let me direct your attention (back) to the Arar case. This story got shockingly little attention in the U.S., despite being a major issue up in Canada.

Is this kind of behaviour worth it? How do we balance the risks of terrorism against other kinds of risks?

And if a government is not bound by its own laws, at what point does it begin to resemble a very strong gang rather than a legitimate government?

Wednesday, November 19, 2003

Billmon writes:

But I still can't believe that anyone with half a brain -- which may even include some of the people currently planning military operations -- would consider this an effective way to fight a guerrilla war. Granted, the Brits did have some success using air power to suppress a popular revolt in Iraq back in the '20s. But they used poison gas. I don't think Centcom is ready to dig that deep into its bag of war crimes.

A friendly correction: Actually, the U.S. used napalm during the "major combat" phase of the war in Iraq. The military originally denied using napalm, but it turned out that the denial was based on the fact that the napalm used in Iraq is a second-generation napalm, which has been improved since then. It is no longer officially called napalm, though everyone in the field calls it napalm, and it smells like napalm, works like napalm (except better), and so on.

Napalm is a chemical weapon. Most countries in the world have banned it, though the U.S. has refused to sign the convention outlawing its use.

Now, it's not obvious to me that napalming someone is that much worse than bombing the crap out of them. But then again, I'm not the one who made the conflation of different types of WMD the centerpiece of my rhetorical strategy.

Surely there's an irony here. As far as I know, only two small American newspapers picked up this story. Neither the New York Times or the WaPo touched it.

Tuesday, November 18, 2003

There was a man in the land of New York and his name was CY. and that man was blameless and upright, one who feared God, and turned away from evil. He had a laptop, which was worth more to him than all of the oxen of New Jersey. And lo he did blog on his laptop. And he worked mightily on his PhD during the day, and during the evenings reclined with his laptop and watched Monty Python videos borrowed (for free!) from his university's library. And he was pure of heart, or at least pure enough to hate the evil Bush.

Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the LORD, and Satan also came among them. The LORD said to Satan, "Whence have you come?" Satan answered the LORD, "From going to and fro on the earth, and from walking up and down on it." And the LORD said to Satan, "Have you considered my servant CY, not a perfect man to be sure, but at least he dislikes Bush? And verily he treasures his laptop as a man should."

Then Satan answered the LORD, "Does CY fear computer failure for nought?

Hast thou not hitherto delivered him from system failure, even though he tempted fate this very summer by switching to a PC because he was too cheap [ed. Satan is unfair here. He was too poor.] to buy a Mac? But put his laptop to failure and he will curse his fate to your face."

And the LORD said to Satan, "Behold, all that he has is in your power; only upon himself do not put forth your hand." So Satan went forth from the presence of the LORD.

And CY was frolicking with his laptop on Sunday, tinkering with a blog entry before resuming work on his paper to be delivered on Wednesday, and lo, his computer became sluggish. And lo! when he rebooted his computer began to repair itself. But verily it was completely kaput.

And CY fell on the ground and said: "Without a laptop was I this summer, and without a laptop am I now. Anyway, it's under warranty and as chance would have it I backed up my paper on my email account an hour before disaster."

In all this CY did not sin or despair or feel especially sorry for himself, beyond a little pouting to his wife.

Again there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the LORD, and Satan also came among them to present himself before the LORD. And the LORD said to Satan, "Whence have you come?" Satan answered the LORD, "From going to and fro on the earth, and from walking up and down on it." And the LORD said to Satan, "Have you considered my servant CY, that he's holding up pretty well considering how much he loves his laptop and how nervous he is about the talk."

Then Satan answered the LORD, "What. Ever. But put forth thy hand now, and touch his email account and he will sob like a little girlyman." And the LORD said to Satan, "Behold, he is in your power; only spare the laptop itself."

And so when CY went to check his email Tuesday morning, the day before the talk, verily was his email down. And Satan singled him out, since the email shortage seemed to affect very few people on campus, though the computer geeks did note mail server problems in isolated cases. And verily was CY an isolated case.

And then did CY curse his dependence on technology, having been screwed once before he got his laptop and by the same idiots who run his school's email server. And then did he curl into a ball and wimper and resign himself to finishing the talk in the computer lab, a process involving not only a lot of typing but also the futile attempt to filter out inane conversations going on around him a good deal of the time.

And so, he'd better get to work and stop playing with his blog. But you'll surely understand if it's a little quieter around here for a few days.

BONUS HELPER POINTS: Anyone know what you do if you think you might have lost your Home XP System disk? Verily, I suspect I'm fucked.

UPDATE (much later): If you've just wandered in from Wampum or anywhere else, I've written a little welcome here.

Monday, November 17, 2003

Conrad Black has been forced out as CEO of Hollinger.

This is so very gratifying.

A pompous windbag who "ruled" his media empire from Napoleon's chair, Black richly deserves this humiliation.
Juan Cole writes:

I'd like to see the Saudi royal family get out in front on this issue by forcefully condemning the Istanbul attacks, and by linking them to the Riyadh one, and by coming out against the anti-Jewish bigotry that has become so widespread in the Muslim world. Arabs are always saying they are against Zionism, not against Jews. Well, Turkey's 25,000 remaining Jews are in Turkey because they did not want to be ingathered. The front page of the Saudi daily al-Watan covers the Istanbul bombing. It then quotes President Bush at the end of the article condemning it. But this is a Saudi paper. What are Saudi high officials saying? They are not quoted to my knowledge. The bottom link on the first page is to the campaign by US Zionist organizations to discredit Saudi Arabia and to attempt to link the royal family to terrorism. Well, what better way to change that image than by video of a forceful condemnation by Crown Prince Abdullah of this attack on Jews? Saudi Prince al-Waleed bin Talal has recently said that the Saudi authorities have cracked down on preachers making anti-Jewish comments, since Islam respects the right of Jews to practice their religion. That is a start, but it isn't enough. And, it isn't visible in the West.

Indeed.
Catastrophic computer failure. Expect light posting.

Will return this weekend . . . I hope.

Sunday, November 16, 2003

I can't remember who sent me to this, but it's worth reading. It's a very funny take-down of Thomas Friedman. . . who, of course, deserves it.
I want to call attention to a little noticed irony in hawkish attitudes towards risk, and to use it to reflect a bit on a taboo in American political debate which has potentially serious consequences.

During the Cold War, hawkish attitudes to the risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union were often alarmingly casual. I don’t mean that anyone actually wanted a confrontation. But hawkish rhetoric and strategizing flirted more openly with the risks of nuclear annihilation than many of us were comfortable with – and that includes many of those who supported standing up to the Soviets in all sorts of ways. (This isn't a point aimed exclusively at Republicans, of course - think of McNamara's advice to Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.)

It's worth remembering how serious a risk we were all flirting with. A nuclear exchange would have wiped out life on earth.

Compare this to the threat of terrorism. What is the worst that a terrorist could do? Well, it's pretty damn awful. In the worst case, a small nuclear device packed in a truck in Midtown Manhattan could kill hundreds of thousands, destroy the American economy, spread sickness and devastation, and render my favourite city in the U.S. uninhabitable. But this is still not as awful as the complete and final destruction of life on earth coldly contemplated by hundreds of pointy-heads in government and Think Tanks for the duration of the Cold War. And although this is a difficult judgment call, I think there's considerably less risk of a worst case terrorist attack than there was of a nuclear confrontation.

It isn't being cavalier about terrorism to point this out, since even less than worse case terrorist attacks are awful enough that we ought to be prepared to go very far out of our way to try to prevent them.

And again, I don't mean that anyone intentionally courted disaster during the Cold War. I mean that the risk of nuclear annihilation was never considered an absolute argument stopper when policymakers were weighing risks of different sorts against one another.

The irony, then, is this: Hawks during the cold war went from excessive risk-taking in the face of a far greater threat, to a total refusal nowadays to countenance any course of action that involves an increased risk – however slight - of further terrorism.

Critics of the current administration have noted that many of the hawks who were gaming intelligence during the Cold War were up to the same old tricks during the build-up to the war on Iraq. And indeed, there is a depressing continuity both in actors and tactics here. But it has eluded critics that the underlying attitude towards risk has been completely reversed: The risk of terrorism is no longer considered a risk to be balanced against other risks in other areas. It is a trump card, a genuine argument stopper. It is now the case that to identify a plausible measure in the War on Terror is automatically to have a decisive reason to act, whatever the other consequences.

Now, perhaps this is more a feature of hawkish rhetoric than hawkish belief. Anyone who is serious about protecting Americans from future terrorist attacks should also be serious about adequate funding for homeland security, and this is not something which the Bush administration or its defenders have been serious about. Still, I have a sense that I've put my finger on a real article of faith in the administration and among its supporters. And anyway, it functions as an argument stopper in real political debate, so we might as well treat it as sincere and examine it accordingly.

It might also be objected that the nature of the threat has changed in ways that make this shift in attitudes to risk intelligible. But this overlooks the fact that, for one thing, the risks presented by further terrorism are less serious than the ones contemplated by policymakers and analysts in during the Cold War (What is the best case scenario involving a nuclear exchange?). I think this also overlooks the years of uncertainty during the Cold War about whether, in fact, the Soviets were deterrable. Don't forget that this was once a very open question, especially over the years as each side postured to try to stare down and unnerve the other. But, more important, this objection misses the main point. The undeterrability of terrorist groups is part of the risk we're considering. And what I'm comparing is the risk presented by these two very different kinds of adversaries and the attitudes of American policymakers to that risk.

Without our much noticing or debating it, this principle – the one that says that no risk of terrorism is acceptable under any circumstances, and can't be weighed against any other sort of risk in formulating policy – has hardened into one of the firmest taboos in American political culture. It's the explicit party line of the hawks, who trumpet it most loudly, but it's also never been challenged effectively in the mainstream, as far as I know, and this has allowed it to enter the conventional wisdom by default.

Despite this, I think it's a terrible principle, and one that is bound to mislead Americans. In fact, I think it's bound to make all of us much less safe given enough time.

Let me explain this by describing one of the consequences of the principle in action. Consider the U.S.'s dealings with Russia. The relationship is complex, with all sorts of trade-offs, and I don't want to oversimplify things. But one very prominent justification offered for the U.S.'s steadfast refusal to press Russia on Chechnya, or human rights in general, or the failure to respect the rule of law, or for generally behaving like France on the international stage, or for any number of worrying developments, is that Russia is an ally in the war on terror and provides intelligence cooperation on Muslim extremist groups. (And the same considerations apply to China, more or less, mutatis mutandis.)

Well, I'm sure it does, though I've not heard many stories of actual cooperation. On balance I rather doubt that the trade is worth it, even on its own terms. Russia's behaviour in Chechnya has surely done more to inflame radical Muslim sentiment than its intelligence on radical groups could ever compensate for. But set this aside, and assume that the trade makes sense from the point of view of combating terrorism.

Also set aside – just for the moment - the moral question: Is Russian intelligence so good that it's worth turning a blind eye to the wanton persecution of human beings in Chechnya? Hawks who like to brag about saving Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo might want to chew on that one for a while. It's a bit deflating to add Chechnya – and the U.S.'s non-response to it - to this supposedly glorious story. Pooty-Poot is a war criminal, and anyone who stares into his beady little eyes and comes away without shuddering is a fool or worse. But let this go for a minute.

The most serious prudential point is that U.S. policies which subordinate the goal of fighting terrorist groups over everything else miss the fact that an increasingly unhealthy Russia is bad for the U.S. (and a lot of other people, like, for example, Russians) for all kinds of reasons quite unrelated to terrorism. Investment, a stable source of oil, a potentially reliable partner, an actor on the global stage which still has considerable influence – all these things are set at risk by the sort of political decay in Russia that the U.S. has so clearly declined to resist since the collapse of the U.S.S.R.

This is a bipartisan criticism, by the way, and a problem in which – just to be clear – there are more factors than an interest in combating terrorism. I think Clinton's coddling of Yeltsin for quite different reasons played a crucial, and very unfortunate, role in bringing things to this point.

But the War on Terror as an article of unquestioned faith has made things much worse, and now stands firmly in the way of a re-evaluation of the policy. Here, then, is the effect of the taboo: Our politicians (and indeed, most of the chattering class) now lack the vocabulary, and perhaps even the conceptual tools, that would help to evaluate the various risks and balance them sensibly. That's because balancing them sensibly would require them to seriously consider the possibility that other considerations might, in principle, outweigh the risks posed by terrorism. It might make sense to accept slightly more risk in the War on Terror in order to achieve a more stable Russia, assuming for the moment that helping to bring about a stable Russia actually did require the U.S. to jeopardize a potential source of intelligence on extremist groups. In fact, I think this particular trade off would be worth it. And I live in New York!

Now, part of the solution here would be to try to figure out a way to frame the political debate which doesn't allow this point to be distorted into the simplistic claim that critics of the assumption are soft on terrorism, and don't take national security seriously. Perhaps you can figure this out. I'm not sure I can.

It's important to rethink this mess of intuitions from the start. For the refusal to consider different sorts of trade-offs influences more than just foreign policy. It figures prominently in the debate over civil liberties, for example. People have assumed that Ashcroft and others are acting consistently with past positions when they balance civil liberties against terrorist measures and civil liberties come off worse for it. But in fact we've come a very long way from the days of "Better dead than red". It would be nice to have just a bit more of that spirit back in the right. It would be better to have just a bit more of that spirit back in all of us.